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On December 13, 2001, the 107th Congress authorized a 
round of base realignment and closure (BRAC) for 2005.  
This policy decision was preceded by years of political 
dispute and dialogue between Congress and the executive 
branch.  Much of this debate centered on the Clinton 
Administration’s privatization-in-place of two bases 
scheduled for closure by the 1995 BRAC Commission and the 
dispute over estimated BRAC costs and savings.  After 
painstaking compromise and a national security crisis, 
reformed BRAC legislation was passed, balancing political 
leadership and national strategy with job loss and 
disruption to local communities.  A comprehensive analysis 
of journal articles, books, relevant congressional records, 
government reports, and legislation identifies the 
variables that explain Congress’s decision to amend the 
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 and 
authorize a BRAC round in 2005.  Congress eventually 
approved BRAC 2005 because: (1) a new presidential 
administration concurred with DoD’s argument regarding 
excessive infrastructure and anticipated savings from BRAC; 
(2) national economic conditions could not support both 
spending for excess infrastructure and the war on 
terrorism; (3) studies confirmed that most communities can 
rebound economically after a base closure; and (4) the 
improved BRAC law purportedly reduced the parochial 
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On June 28, 2001 in a statement to the House Armed 
Services Committee (HASC), the U.S. Secretary of Defense, 
Donald H. Rumsfeld, declared that a “rationalization and 
restructuring of DoD infrastructure was needed” and that 
“Under our Efficient Facilities Initiative, a 20-25% 
reduction in excess military bases and facilities could 
generate savings of several billion dollars annually” 
(Rumsfeld, 2001b).  This wasn’t the first time that a U.S. 
Secretary of Defense had declared an excess of military 
bases.   
Indeed, the previous Defense Secretary, William S. 
Cohen, “indicated every year” in his Annual Report to the 
President and the Congress: that “our greatest opportunity 
for savings lies in continued reductions in the excess 
infrastructure left over from the Cold War,” and that 
“another two rounds of BRAC could ultimately save over $20 
billion by 2015” (Annual Report, 2001, p. ix).  Secretary 
Cohen further stated, “DoD needs at least two additional 
rounds of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) to divest 
itself of non-critical excess capacity” (Annual Report, 
2001, p. 213). 
  1
Despite years of Department of Defense (DoD) requests, 
Congress resisted authorizing another BRAC round (Lockwood, 
2002).  Congressional reluctance stemmed from years of 
controversy surrounding the 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995 BRAC 
rounds (Lockwood, 2002; Siehl, 1997a).  As a result, the 
United States continued to have trouble closing its 
military bases in order to match downsized force 
requirements (Siehl, 1997a).   
In 1988, Congress initiated the BRAC process to reduce 
excess military infrastructure following the Cold War 
drawdown (Sorenson, 1998).  Congress wasn’t pleased with 
the 1988 special commission chartered by the Secretary of 
Defense, and in 1990 created an independent commission to 
oversee the three authorized BRAC rounds of 1991, 1993, and 
1995 (GAO, 2002; Sorenson, 1998).  By 1996, with the 
expiration of the 1990 BRAC legislation, DoD’s authority to 
close or realign bases reverted to the highly restrictive 
1970’s BRAC legislation (GAO, 1997).  As a result, in 1997, 
the Secretary of Defense asked Congress to authorize two 
more BRAC rounds (Lockwood, 2002). 
However, the last round, the 1995 BRAC round, proved 
to be highly controversial (Lockwood, 2002).  The 1995 BRAC 
Commission had recommended the closing of two Air Force 
maintenance depots in California and Texas (BRAC Report, 
1995).  However, the Clinton Administration vigorously 
opposed closing these two bases (Lockwood, 2002).  Arguing 
that these states had already suffered disproportionately, 
the President forcefully implemented “privatization-in-
place” (Lockwood, 2002).  Congressional resentment over 
President Clinton’s intervention persisted until the end of 
his second term and this intervention was repeatedly cited 
as the primary reason for congressional opposition to 
another BRAC round (Lockwood, 2002). 
Congress remained reluctant to endorse new base 
closure legislation, even though the Congressional Budget 
Office estimated that, “When all of the actions from the 
  2
four BRAC rounds are completed, DoD will save about $5.6 
billion a year in operating cost” (CBO, 2001).  DoD also 
informed Congress that it estimated a “net savings of about 
$15.5 billion as of the end of FY 2002” (Lockwood, 2002). 
The Clinton Administration’s repeated calls for 
“additional rounds” were never authorized.  It wasn’t until 
informed by Mr. Rumsfeld that “one way that Congress could 
help us [the new Bush Administration] in this regard is to 
authorize additional BRAC rounds” that Congress finally 
authorized base closings (Rumsfeld, 2001a; S.1438, 2001).  
This study will focus on the significant explanatory 
variables that allowed the 107th Congress to amend the 
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 and 
authorize a BRAC round in 2005. 
 
B. PURPOSE 
The objective of this research is to identify the 
significant explanatory variables involved in the decision 
of the 107th Congress to amend the Defense Base Closure and 
Realignment Act of 1990 and authorize a base realignment 
and closure round in 2005.  Research will begin with a 
historical review of the BRAC process, and then examine and 
explain the legislative differences in the BRAC Acts of 
1988, 1990, and 2001 (GAO, 2002).  After highlighting the 
congressional arguments and controversies surrounding base 
closure from the 1960s until 2003, this research will then 
explain how the FY2002 Defense Authorization Act overcame 
previous objections to further BRAC legislation and 
achieved consensus from the 107th Congress to authorize a 
BRAC round in 2005 (GAO, 2002; Sorenson, 1998). 
  3
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question to be addressed in this 
thesis is: What are the significant explanatory variables 
that allowed the 107th Congress to amend the Defense Base 
Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 and authorize a base 
realignment and closure (BRAC) round in 2005. 
 
Subsidiary questions are: 
 
1. What is the organizational framework of the base 
closing process?  
 
2. What are the important differences in the base closing 
laws of 1977, 1988, 1990, and 2001? 
 
3. What were the important policy issues surrounding base 
closure from the 1960s until 2001? 
 
4. How did the FY2002 Defense Authorization Act resolve 
the issues surrounding base closure from the 1960s until 
2001? 
 
D. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
This research will yield insights relevant to the Base 
Realignment and Closure process.  It will be useful in 
further understanding the relationship between Department 
of Defense goals and congressional policymaking.  Finally, 
this thesis will provide a detailed understanding of the 
military/political decision-making process of BRAC.  
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E. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY  
This thesis will: (1) review the BRAC legislative 
process; (2) review congressional testimony and other 
evidence related to BRAC; and (3) identify the critical 
features of the 2001 BRAC legislation adopted by Congress. 
 
F. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used in this thesis will consist of 
the following steps: 
  
• A literature review of congressional records, 
government reports, news articles, journals, Web 
sites, and legislation concerning BRAC. 
 
• A review of congressional testimony concerning BRAC.  
 
• An analysis of Title 10, U.S. Code, Chapter 159, 
section 2687, Base Closures and Realignments. 
 
• An examination of the FY2002 President’s budget 
proposing Department of Defense infrastructure 
reduction. 
 
• An analysis of the FY2002 Defense Authorization Act 
concerning BRAC 2005. 
 
G. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
The thesis begins with a historical summary of base 
closure policy since the late 1960s and provides a brief 
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description of the base closing process.  The study 
highlights the reasoning behind base closings prior to the 
1988 legislation, the commission process from 1991-1995, 
and discusses the political controversy concerning the 1995 
BRAC round.  This section of analysis identifies the 
important differences in the base closing laws of 1977, 
1988, 1990, and 2001. 
The next portion of the study identifies several 
variables that led to the amending of the Defense Base 
Closure and Realignment Act of 1990.  Providing an overview 
of the Department of Defense BRAC requests, the analysis 
focuses on the disruption to local communities, disputed 
BRAC savings, environmental cleanup costs, and the 
introduction of a new administration.  A detailed 
examination of the Bush Administration’s initial proposal, 
followed by Senate and House action authorizing a round of 
base closure and realignment in 2005 is conducted.  The 
postponement of the BRAC Commission until 2005 is also 
addressed.  The study concentrates on an analysis of the 
FY2002 BRAC legislation and the congressional approach to 
obtain a favorable BRAC outcome. 
Finally, the thesis summarizes the changed base 
closing process.  The review explains how the FY2002 
Defense Authorization Act resolved the issues surrounding 
base closure between 1995 and 2001, and how congressional 




II. HISTORY OF BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In his seminal work, Essence of Decision, Graham 
Allison demonstrates that “Government decision-making is a 
complex multi-participant process” (Allison, 1999, p. 263).  
Accordingly, base closure policy is the result of 
“compromise, conflict, and confusion among government 
officials with diverse interests and unequal influence” 
(Allison, p. 295).  Understanding the struggle over base 
closing policy, as evidenced in the 1960s and clearly 
witnessed in the mid-1990s, clarifies the “multiple causes 
that defy simple summary and easy generalization” (Allison, 
p. 263; Hadwiger, 1993; McCutchen, 1998; Siehl, 1997b).  
This chapter discusses the complex legislative evolution of 
base closure policy from the 1960’s and ends with an 
overview of the 1995 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 
round.     
  
B. EARLY BASE CLOSURE POLICY 
In the early 1960s, the Department of Defense (DoD) 
closed military bases in an effort to reduce military 
overhead (McCutchen, 1998).1  During this period, DoD 
conducted hundreds of base closures and realignments, 
closing more than 60 major bases without congressional 
consultation (BRAC Report, 1995; Globalsecurity, 2002).  In 
fact, DoD so dominated the base closure process that in 
1967 Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara openly boasted, 
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1 Base closures have followed every significant military drawdown 
throughout U.S. history (Sorenson, 1998; Huebner, 1997). 
“we have not reversed a single base closure decision due to 
[congressional] pressure” (Hadwiger, 1993, p. 43).  These 
closings continued even though the Chairman of the House 
Armed Services Committee (HASC), and the Chairman of the 
Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) declared many of 
these base closures were “totally unjustified” (Cong. Rec., 
1988a).   
Fighting executive power to close bases, HASC Chairman 
Mendel Rivers introduced base closure reform legislation in 
1965 (Hadwiger, 1993).  The HASC Chairman challenged 
executive prerogative by quoting Article I, section 8 of 
the U.S. Constitution: “The Congress shall have power...To 
raise and support Armies...To provide and maintain a Navy; 
To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land 
and naval forces” (Hadwiger, 1993 p. 61; U.S. 
Constitution).  Mr. Rivers then asserted that if Congress 
has this constitutional power, surely Congress could 
require DoD to notify the U.S. House when a base would be 
closed (Hadwiger, 1993).  However, Congress lost the 1965 
battle.   
While vetoing the 1965 attempt to intervene in base 
closure policy, President Johnson summarized executive 
prerogative: 
By the Constitution, the executive power is 
vested in the President.  The President is the 
Commander in Chief of the armed forces.  The 
President cannot sign into law a bill which 
substantially inhibits him from performing his 
duty.  He cannot sign into law a measure which 
deprives him of power ... and which prohibits him 
from closing, abandoning or substantially 
reducing in  mission any military facility in the 
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country.  The times do not permit it.  The 
Constitution prohibits it (Johnson, 1965; 
Goldfein, 1994, p. 4). 
As long as the executive branch maintained control 
over base closings, they were able to punish uncooperative 
members of Congress by unexpectedly closing bases in their 
district (Siehl, 1997b; Sorenson, 1998).  In fact, Congress 
fully recognized, “that Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon 
were both known to use bases for political reprisals” 
(Cong. Rec., 1988a).   
Throughout the 1960s, Congress continued to concede to 
executive prerogative (Hadwiger, 1993).  Well into the 
1970s, base closings continued independent of congressional 
control as hundreds of bases were closed in response to the 
end of the Vietnam War (McCutchen, 1998).  Throughout the 
1970s, individual legislators made muted attempts to 
forestall potential base closings in their districts, but 
it wasn’t until after the prolonged struggle in the Vietnam 
conflict that Congress successfully challenged the 
“imperial presidency,” and expanded its power “to make 
rules for the Government” concerning base closures (GAO, 
1997; Hadwiger, 1993, p. 92; Sorenson, 1998; U.S. 
Constitution).   
Between 1976 and 1988, Congress essentially blocked 
DoD’s efforts to close military bases (GAO, 1997; Siehl, 
1997b).  In the name of saving jobs and reducing federal 
spending, Congress prevented DoD from closing any major 
domestic bases during this period (Siehl, 1997a, 1997b).  
The Speaker of the House, Tip O’Neill, who popularized the 
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quote “all politics is local,” led the way in 
congressionally imposed restrictions (O’Neill, 1994, p. xv; 
Hadwiger, 1993, p. 72).   
Speaker O’Neill, an ardent proponent for congressional 
base closure reform, and Congressman William S. Cohen, a 
future Secretary of Defense who, ironically, would decades 
later implore Congress “every year” for “at least two 
additional rounds” of BRAC, sponsored an amendment to the 
fiscal 1977 Military Construction Authorization bill 
(Annual Report, 2001, p. ix; Hadwiger, 1993).2  The 
amendment required DoD to submit a “detailed justification 
of the proposed closure or reduction” to the HASC 
concerning any base employing 500 or more civilians 
(Hadwiger, 1993, p. 77).  President Gerald Ford vetoed the 
Military Construction Authorization bill citing that it 
“raises serious questions by its attempt to limit my powers 
over military bases” (Ford, 1976; Hadwiger, 1993, p. 79).   
However, the next year Congress not only incorporated 
the O’Neill-Cohen proposal into its fiscal 1978 Military 
Construction Authorization bill, but increased the 
stipulations and made them permanent (Hadwiger, 1993).  On 
August 1st, 1977, President Jimmy Carter accepted Public 
Law 95-82 (Globalsecurity, 2002).  The passage of the 1977 
base closure reform law wrestled “total authority” from 
“the hands of the executive branch” and significantly 
expanded the power of Congress to determine base closure 
policy (Globalsecurity, 2002; Cong. Rec., 1988a).   
The 1977 base closure law required DoD to comply “with 
the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act 
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[NEPA] of 1969 with respect to [each] proposed closure or 
realignment” (BRAC Report, 1995; Hadwiger 1993, p. 85).  
Closure of any base with at least 300 civilian personnel or 
a realignment involving 1,000 civilian employees now 
required DoD compliance (BRAC Report, 1998, p. 25).  NEPA 
adherence obligated DoD to submit comprehensive 
environmental impact statements before closing a base 
(Cong. Rec., 1988a).  The law further directed the 
Secretary of Defense to notify Congress when a base was 
scheduled for closure or realignment and to provide “a 
detailed justification for such decision, including 
statements of the estimated fiscal, local economic, 
budgetary, environmental, strategic and operational 
consequences of the proposed closure or realignment” 
(Globalsecurity, 2002; Hadwiger 1993, p. 86).  Because it 
mandated such extensive legal regulations, the 1977 law 
prevented DoD from closing any major military installation 
from 1977 to 1990 (Cong. Rec., 1988a; Siehl, 1997b; CBO, 
1996).   
 
C. BRAC: 1988 
Although best remembered for increased defense 
spending, the Reagan Administration was also concerned 
about eliminating “inefficiency, waste and abuse in the 
Federal Government” (Sorenson, 1998; President’s Survey, 
1983b).  In 1982, President Reagan established the 
“President’s Private Sector Survey on Cost Control,” 
commonly known as the “Grace Commission” (Sorenson, 1998, 
p. 44).  Observing that DoD maintained over 5,600 separate 
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2 Mr. Cohen provides an example for Allison’s forewarning that often 
where you stand depends on where you sit (Allison, p. 277). 
installations worldwide, the Grace Commission concluded 
that “significant savings opportunities” could be 
identified, if the government conducted an “aggressive 
program to close or realign a significant number of 
military bases” (President’s Survey, 1983a, p. 103).  The 
Commission also recommended that DoD improve efficiency by 
consolidating many of its underused maintenance depots 
(President’s Survey, 1983a, p. 74).  However, the 
Commission admitted base closures were “politically 
painful,” and recommended the “establishment of a 
Presidentially appointed bipartisan commission to study” 
the issue further (President’s Survey, 1983a, p. 103, 
1983b, III-9).3   
After reaching its high water mark of over $400 
billion in 1985, defense spending was significantly 
decreased, forcing DoD to struggle with a dramatically 
reduced force structure (Sorensen, 1998; Stedman, 1999; 
QDR, 1997).  By 1988, with the decline and eventual 
collapse of the Soviet Union, DoD wanted to reduce its Cold 
War base structure and use the savings toward improved 
readiness and new weapon systems development (Lockwood, 
2001).  The end of the Cold War signaled to all in Congress 
that there was a considerable mismatch between force size 
and base infrastructure (Sorensen, 1998). 
Congressional awareness of the need to shrink the size 
of the U.S. military and increase its efficiency actually 
predated the removal of the Berlin Wall in 1989 (Mayer, 
1988; Siehl 1997a).  As the national economy staggered 
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3 Just as base closures have followed every significant military 
drawdown, it is noteworthy that no bases were closed during the Reagan 
buildup (Sorenson, 1998; Siehl, 1997b). 
under historically high budget deficits, DoD’s 
discretionary spending was targeted for fiscal cutbacks 
(Stedman, 1999).  Initially both liberal democrats and 
conservative republicans supported base closings (Sorensen, 
1998).  Liberals saw BRAC as a way to curb defense 
spending, and Republicans saw it as a way to balance the 
budget without cutting military strength (Sorensen, 1998).  
With the Government “facing huge Federal budget deficits,” 
many in Congress believed that “the closure and sale of 
surplus bases could be an important source of savings and 
revenue” (Dixon, 1988; Mayer, 1988, p. 1).   
In fiscal year 1988, Congressman Dick Armey introduced 
an amendment to the Defense Authorization bill calling for 
a “Bipartisan Commission on Consolidation of Military 
Bases” (Armey 1987; Hadwiger, 1993).4  During the ensuing 
debate, Armey stated, “I think this will save...or have the 
capacity to save as much as $5 billion each year after it 
is enacted” (Armey, 1987; Hadwiger, 1993).  Armey further 
clarified that his amendment “eliminates waste, cuts the 
red tape from base closing, and allows the process to go 
forward without fear of political reprisals” (Armey, 1987).  
However, many individual members wanted “to keep open bases 
in their district,” and worried “that an administration 
would use the power to close bases as a political weapon” 
(Heinz, 1988; Morella, 1987).  The Secretary of Defense and 
the Chairman of the HASC also opposed Armey’s 1987 
amendment, and it was defeated by a seven-vote margin 
(Cong. Rec., 1987; Hadwiger, 1993).     
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4 Congressman Armey’s base closure bill incorporated many of the 1982 
Grace Commission’s recommendations (Hadwiger, 1993). 
The following year, Armey “adopted a new approach to 
the problem,” and introduced H.R. 4481, “The Defense 
Savings Act of 1988” (Cong. Rec., 1988b; Mayer, 1988, p. 
1).  Four versions of the base closure bill evolved as 
various committees claimed jurisdiction (Cong. Rec., 
1988b).  However, after considerable compromise, Armey 
crafted a substitute amendment that won the approval of Les 
Aspin, Chairmen of the HASC, and Sam Nunn, Chairman of the 
SASC (Nunn, 1988b; Richardson, 1995).  The one-time only 
legislation authorized partial exemption from NEPA, 
delegation of property disposal authority, and provided 
Congress an “all or nothing” method of approving the base 
closing recommendations (BRAC Report, 1995; Kolbe, 1988).  
With the powerful support of both Chairmen of the HASC and 
SASC, Armey’s proposal passed both Houses by a wide margin 
and became the basis for Public Law 100-526 (Delay, 1988; 
Hadwiger, 1993).   
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This time Secretary of Defense, Frank Carlucci, after 
consultation with Congress, endorsed Armey’s amendment 
(Cong. Rec., 1988b; Hadwiger, 1993; Nunn, 1988b).  In May 
1988, several months before Congress completed its debate 
on base closure, Carlucci established a commission on base 
realignment and closure (CBO, 1996; Cong. Rec., 1988b).  
The Secretary chartered the Commission to “study the issues 
surrounding military base realignment and closure within 
the United States,” and “determine the best process” (BRAC 
Report, 1988, p. 37).  In order to reduce parochial 
politics, many members thought “it was important that the 
commissioners be named prior to the [base closure] bill 
coming to the floor,” so that Congress “could have the 
opportunity to look over the [Commission’s] membership” 
(Dickinson, 1988).  Despite the initial precautions, many 
still charged that the 1988 BRAC process was flawed by 
“partisan politics” (Cong. Rec., 1988b; Sorenson, 1998). 
Under the 1988 BRAC law process, the individual 
Services proposed a list of bases to the twelve-member 
Commission appointed by the Secretary of Defense (Base 
Closure Act, 1988; BRAC Report, 1988; Nunn, 1988a).  The 
Commission, reporting directly to Secretary Carlucci, 
generated the official list of recommended closures (BRAC 
Report, 1995).  Using colored dots to display base 
selection criteria, the 1988 Commission conducted all of 
its hearings and votes in closed session (BRAC Report, 
1995; Hadwiger, 1993).  The Secretary of Defense, without 
authority to add or delete bases, reviewed the 
recommendations and forwarded the list to the President 
(BRAC Report, 1988; Carlucci, 1989; Nunn, 1988a).  Carlucci 
declared his responsibility was “to endorse or reject their 
report as a whole,” and believed he was “prohibited from 
altering the BRAC list (Carlucci, 1989).  After approving 
the Commission’s report, the President then sent it to 
Congress (Gordon, 1988).  Upon receiving the list, Congress 
either approved the list in its entirety, or passed a 
“Joint resolution disapproving the recommendations” of the 
Commission (BRAC Act, 1988; Cong. Rec., 1988b).   
The Commission released its report on December 29, 
1988, less than two months after Congress authorized its 
implementation (Congress, 1988; Hadwiger, 1993).  The 
Commission recommended the closure of 86 facilities, of 
which 16 were major bases (installations employing 300 or 
more employees) and the realignment of 54 bases (BRAC 
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Report, 1988, 1995; Hadwiger, 1993).  The report impacted 
145 bases and affected the electoral districts of 32 
Senators and 21 members of Congress (Hadwiger, 1993; Siehl, 
1997b).  The 1988 BRAC Commission dissolved after 
submitting its final report, but the political debate 
continued (Siehl, 1997b; Sorenson, 1998).   
The 1988 BRAC process failed to eliminate the 
appearance of politics from the start (Sorenson, 1998).  
Many members were upset that the Commission conducted the 
majority of its deliberations in private session (Hadwiger, 
1993).  Armey’s original bill and the Grace Commission both 
recommended a “Presidentially appointed” commission to 
alleviate any political pressure that could be placed on 
the Secretary of Defense as a political appointee (Cong. 
Rec., 1987; President’s Survey, 1983b; Sorenson, 1998).  
Additionally, the Commission’s late start, and its mandate 
to analyze DoD’s 3,800 facilities significantly impaired 
its ability to verify Pentagon data and visit any bases 
selected for closure (Dixon, 1988; Hadwiger, 1993; Specter, 
1988).  After examining the base closure criteria, 
Congresswoman Pat Schroeder testified that the Commission 
used “inaccurate information, faulty computations, or bad 
modeling in many cases” (Schroeder, 1989).   
Although Les Aspin reported that “the distribution of 
the closed bases” looked “pretty fair and pretty 
reasonable,” his criticism of the Commission's work was 
that it was “too modest,” and that “savings to be gained 
from base closings really are overblown.  Only $700 million 
a year after the closing costs” (Aspin, 1988).  This was 
far less than the $2 billion to $5 billion annual savings 
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suggested by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
(President’s Survey 1983a, p. 108).  Additionally, the 
closures represented only a three percent reduction in 
domestic base structure (BRAC Report, 1995).  Although two 
dozen congressional members were seriously affected, 
Congress breathed a great sigh of relief, and allowed BRAC 
I to go forward, believing “it was better for the outgoing 
administration to make this kind of hard decision” (Aspin, 
1988; Dixon, 1988).  The Chairman of the HASC thought it 
would be a decade before Congress faced another BRAC round 
(Aspin, 1988).  As it happened, Aspin sponsored legislation 
calling for another BRAC round less than two years later 
(H.R. 4739, 1990). 
 
D. BRAC: 1990 
Congress wasn’t overly pleased with the 1988 special 
commission chartered by the Secretary of Defense, and in 
1990, created an independent commission to oversee the 
three authorized BRAC rounds of 1991, 1993, and 1995 (GAO, 
2002; Sorenson, 1998).  Although still subject to the 
restrictive 1977 base closure law, Secretary of Defense 
Dick Cheney triggered congressional action by unilaterally 
presenting Congress with a list of 46 bases selected for 
closure in January 1990 (Siehl, 1997b; Aspin, 1990; BRAC 
Report, 1995).  Chairman Aspin declared that DoD violated 
the base closure process previously established by law, and 
that the list was illegal (Aspin, 1990).  The appearance of 
multiple, conflicting base closure lists from the 
individual Services to various committees and members only 
stimulated the procedural debate (Aspin, 1990).  Aspin 
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accused Dick Cheney of “playing at base closings while 
playing politics” (Aspin, 1990).  Declaring also that 29 of 
the 35 proposed bases fell disproportionately in Democratic 
districts, the HASC Chairman rejected Secretary Cheney’s 
list (Aspin, 1990).  Nonetheless, Aspin acknowledged 
congressional responsibility to approve base closures, but 
only through a bipartisan commission process (Aspin, 1990).  
Although there was the expected major floor fight over the 
issue, Congress enacted P.L. 101-510, the Defense Base 
Closure and Realignment Act of 1990   (Schroeder, 1990a; 
Siehl, 1997b).        
The 1990 law mandated a significant number of base 
closing provisions to avoid “the sloppiness and secrecy” of 
BRAC I (Schroeder, 1990b; Siehl, 1997b).  First, it charged 
the Pentagon to evaluate all military installations within 
the U.S. on the basis of a DoD “Force Structure Plan,” 
using congressionally approved selection criteria (Aspin, 
1991; BRAC Report, 1995; Defense BRAC Act, 1990).  DoD 
subsequently established three categories of selection 
criteria, “Military Value,” “Return on Investment,” and 
“Community Impacts” (GAO, 1997, p. 54; BRAC Report, 1995).   
Attempting to standardize the decision-making process 
further, DoD used the Cost of Base Realignment Actions 
(COBRA) model for all four BRAC rounds to determine initial 
BRAC cost and savings (GAO, 1997).  The 1990 statute 
specifically mandated DoD to provide economic adjustment 
assistance to any community and outplacement assistance to 
DoD civilian employees affected by base closings (Defense 
BRAC Act, 1990).  It further directed the Secretary of 
Defense to ensure that the environmental restoration of 
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closing installations occur as soon as possible (Siehl, 
1997b).  Finally, the statute established time lines for 
DoD, the President, the Commission, GAO, and Congress to 
follow (GAO, 1997). 
The 1990 law attempted to insulate the BRAC Commission 
from partisan politics as well (BRAC Report, 1995).  The 
law obligated the General Accounting Office (GAO) to 
conduct a detailed study of DoD’s recommendations and 
selection process, as well as assist the Commission in 
their analyses (BRAC Report, 1995).  It directed the 
Commission to conduct open hearings and make its records 
available to the public (Defense BRAC Act, 1990).  Learning 
from BRAC I, the Commission also ensured that at least one 
Commissioner visited each major site proposed for closure 
(BRAC Report, 1995).  Finally, the law also stipulated that 
no more than one-third of the Commission’s staff could be 
DoD employees (Defense BRAC Act, 1990).       
The new BRAC Commission consisted of eight 
presidentially-appointed members, with the advice and 
consent of the Senate (Defense BRAC Act, 1990).  In 
determining Commission bipartisanship, the 1990 Act 
required the President to consult the Speaker of the House 
in appointing two members, the Senate Majority Leader on 
two, and the Senate and House Minority Leaders on one 
appointee each  (Defense BRAC Act, 1990).  To further 
minimize partisan politics, Congress directed the 
Commission to convene only during the non-election years of 
1991, 1993, and 1995 (Siehl, 1997b). 
Under the 1990 law, the individual Services presented 
a list of bases to the Secretary of Defense (BRAC Report, 
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1995).  After reviewing the Services’ recommendations, the 
Secretary submitted the consolidated list to the BRAC 
Commission (BRAC Report, 1995; GAO, 1997).  With authority 
to add or delete bases, the Commission reviewed the 
recommendations and forwarded the list to the President 
(BRAC Report, 1995; Siehl, 1997b).  However, the 1990 BRAC 
law provided the President with several options (Defense 
BRAC Act, 1990).  The President could accept the 
Commission’s recommendations and send the list to Congress, 
or reject them and require the Commission to present a 
revised list (Defense BRAC Act, 1990).  After receiving the 
new list, the President could also legally terminate the 
base closing process by not forwarding the list to Congress 
(BRAC Report, 1995; Defense BRAC Act, 1990).  Like the 1988 
statute, the 1990 law required Congress to either approve 
the list in its entirety or pass a “Joint resolution 
disapproving the recommendations” of the Commission 
(Defense BRAC Act, 1990). 
 
E. BRAC: 1991-1995 OVERVIEW  
Adhering to the legislatively mandated timeline, DoD 
released its proposed closure list in April 1991 to the 
BRAC Commission (Siehl, 1997b).  The Secretary of Defense 
suggested the closing and realignment of 71 bases, 
recommending 43 for closure and 28 for realignment (Matsui, 
1991).  After conducting hearings and analysis, the 
Commission issued a list of “preliminary candidates” a 
month later, and on July 1, 1991 submitted its “final list” 
to the President (Siehl, 1997b).  The BRAC II Commission 
recommended closing 82 bases, of which 26 were major 
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facilities (BRAC Report, 1995).  The reductions represented 
five percent of the domestic base structure, and an 
estimated savings of $1.5 billion annually (BRAC Report, 
1995).  On July 10, President Bush approved the 
Commission’s report and transmitted it to Congress (Siehl, 
1997b).  Subsequently, “uproar over the proposed base 
closures” occurred in Congress (Ford, 1991).   
Most members believed “the commission process 
fulfilled its promise of fairness” (Aspin, 1991).  However, 
there were accusations of “internal Pentagon politics being 
played” (Weldon, 1991).  Members accused the Navy of 
“thumbing their noses at the process,” and the Army of 
“backroom decision-making” (Aspin, 1991; Matsui, 1991).  
Additionally, GAO reported that the Services used 
inaccurate data in the COBRA model (McMillen, 1991).  
Despite the controversy, Congress decided the BRAC II 
process was “far superior to the unfair closure attempts 
made” in 1988 and by not passing a joint resolution to 
disapprove, made BRAC II the “law of the land” (Atkins, 
1991; Cong. Rec., 1991; Molinari, 1991).  Nonetheless, BRAC 
affected members warned their colleagues to improve the 
BRAC process for 1993 and 1995 (Cong. Rec., 1991). 
On January 5, 1993, before leaving office, President 
Bush submitted eight nominees to the BRAC III Commission 
(Nunn, 1993).  President Clinton implicitly agreed to the 
bipartisan appointees (Nunn, 1993).  James Courter, the 
1991 Commission Chairman, headed the new Commission (Siehl, 
1997b).  Les Aspin, after becoming the 18th Defense 
Secretary, submitted “the mother of all base closures” to 
the BRAC Commission on March 12, 1993 (BRAC Report, 1995; 
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Feinstein, 1993; SecDefs, 2002a).  After conducting 125 
base visits and 17 regional hearings, the Commission 
forwarded its report to President Clinton on July 1, 1993 
(Nunn, 1993).  The BRAC III Commission recommended closing 
130 bases and realigning 45 others (BRAC Report, 1995).  
Twenty-eight were major installations (BRAC Report, 1995).  
Agreeing with the entirety of the Commission’s report, 
President Clinton sent it to Congress for a “healthy debate 
regarding the base closure process” (Nunn, 1993).   
The 1993 base closings generated “powerful feelings of 
anger, denial, and resistance” from citizens and elected 
officials alike (Pryor, 1993).  Congress expressed “deep 
feelings of sympathy for the significant adverse economic 
impact” and “trauma of base closures” experienced by local 
communities (Nunn, 1993).  However, GAO reported that the 
Pentagon, notwithstanding the unexpected escalation of 
environmental restoration costs, used a sound approach 
(Nunn, 1993).  Although many members felt BRAC III was “not 
perfect,” Congress acknowledged DoD’s struggle with a 
significant mismatch between force size and base 
infrastructure (Nunn, 1993; Glenn, 1993).  On 20 September 
1993, Congress accepted the Commission's report in its 
entirety (Cong. Rec., 1993).  The reductions represented 
six percent of the domestic base structure and an estimated 
annual savings of $2.3 billion (BRAC Report, 1995). 
On 28 February 1995, Secretary of Defense William 
Perry submitted a closure list to the 1995 BRAC Commission 
calling for the closure and realignment of 146 facilities, 
33 of which were major facilities (BRAC Report, 1995; House 
Report 104-220, 1995).  The 1995 Commission dropped 13 
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bases and added nine new ones from DoD’s list (Hellman, 
2001).  After conducting 206 base visits and 16 regional 
hearings, the 1995 BRAC Commission recommended closing or 
realigning 132 installations, 28 of which were major bases 
(H. Rpt. 104-220, 1995).  Although the Commission’s final 
report differed slightly from DoD’s, it would prove highly 
controversial (Siehl, 1997b).   
The BRAC Commission forwarded its report to President 
Clinton on June 30, 1995 (BRAC Report, 1995; Siehl, 1997b).  
President Clinton approved the Commission's report, but 
told Congress to allow “Privatization-in-Place” to be “an 
integral part of the [BRAC] report” (Clinton, 1995).  
Congress was “seriously concerned” about the President’s 
handling of the bipartisan process (H. Rpt. 104-220, 1995).  
After considerable debate, (discussed in the next chapter) 
Congress allowed the last BRAC round to proceed (Siehl, 
1997b).  The BRAC IV Commission expected annual savings of 
$1.6 billion, and when combined with closures from the 
other three rounds, a 21 percent reduction in the domestic 
base structure (H. Rpt 104-220, 1995; Lockwood, 2001).  All 
four BRAC rounds resulted in the decision to close 97 of 
495 major domestic bases (GAO, 1997).  By 1996, with the 
expiration of the 1990 BRAC legislation, DoD’s authority to 
close or realign bases reverted to the highly restrictive 


































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  24
III. BASE CLOSING: CLINTON ADMINISTRATION   
A. INTRODUCTION 
Although, the 1995 BRAC round was advertised as “the 
mother of all BRACs,” in actuality, it wasn’t much bigger 
than the 1993 round (Goodman, 1998).  Nevertheless, the 
1995 BRAC spawned a mammoth political debate.  In Essence 
of Decision, Allison argues, “Presidents rarely, if ever, 
make decisions,” because they are often presented with 
limited options by their organization (Allison, 1999, p. 
165).  Allison adds that because “a policy decision is a 
work in progress...each player pulls and hauls with the 
power at his discretion for outcomes” of their choosing 
(Allison, 1999, pp. 302-303).  President Clinton’s 
involvement with two Air Force depots located in voter-rich 
California and Texas during a presidential election year 
clearly involved multiple actors all seeking competing 
interests (Lockwood, 2002; Kitfield, 1997).   
 
B. BRAC: 1995   
The Department of Defense (DoD) opposed the closing of 
any of its five major Air Force maintenance depots (Devroy, 
1995; BRAC Report, 1995).  The Pentagon proposed to the 
1995 BRAC Commission that, instead of closure, the Air 
Force realign and redistribute workload throughout the 
maintenance depots (“Air Force and DoD Report,” 1995).  The 
Air Force argued that the recommended realignments would 
consolidate production lines and move workloads to a 
minimum number of locations, allowing the reduction of 
personnel, infrastructure, and other costs (Kreisher, 
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1998).  However, the 1995 Commission disagreed and cited 
“significant excess capacity and infrastructure in the Air 
Force depot system,” recommending closure of the least 
efficient maintenance depots located at McClellan Air Force 
Base (CA) and Kelly Air Force Base (TX) (BRAC Report, 1995, 
pp. 85, 109).   
The BRAC Commission felt justified overruling the 
Pentagon’s recommendations because all five of the USAF 
depots were operating at 50 percent capacity, and because 
they believed DoD “deviated substantially from the force-
structure plan,” (BRAC Report, 1995, pp. 84, 109; Lockwood, 
2002).  The General Accounting Office (GAO) determined that 
the “Air Force’s recommendation may not be cost-effective 
and does not solve the problem of excess depot capacity” 
(GAO, 1995, p. 7).  Additionally, GAO estimated a “savings 
of over $200 million annually” if maintenance workloads 
were transferred to the other depots (Inhofe, 1997b).  GAO 
further estimated that the complete closure of McClellan, 
and realignment of Kelly would result in annual savings of 
$468 million (Chambliss, 1997b; Warren, 1997b).  The BRAC 
Commission “considered these factors and concluded that 
large potential savings and excess capacity of the Air 
Force depot system necessitated the difficult decision to 
close these activities and consolidate work at the 
remaining depots” (Inhofe, 1997a). 
The BRAC Commission, recommending the closure of 
McClellan AFB and realignment of Kelly AFB, assumed the Air 
Force would “consolidate” and shift billions of dollars of 
maintenance work to the three surviving depots (BRAC 
Report, 1995, p. 85; Kitfield, 1998b).  Congressional 
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members of the Depot Caucus held a similar hope (Kreisher, 
1998).  On June 30, 1995, the BRAC Commission forwarded its 
report to President Clinton (BRAC Report, 1995; Siehl, 
1997b). 
 
C. MODIFIED BRAC PROCESS 
President Clinton, after calling the BRAC decision “an 
outrage,” and expressing “fist-pounding, finger-pointing” 
anger over the 1995 recommendations, approved the 
Commission's report, but told Congress to allow 
“Privatization-in-Place” to be “an integral part of the 
[BRAC] report” (Harris, 1995; Clinton, 1995). 
The Clinton Administration proposed a “novel plan” of 
“privatization-in-place” for the two depots, with the 
prospect of saving 22,000 jobs in key battlegrounds for the 
1996 presidential election (Lockwood, 2002; Kitfield, 
1998a).  While campaigning at Kelly Air Force Base, 
President Clinton promised, “The people who won the Cold 
War could not be left out in the cold” (Harris, 1995).  As 
described by Secretary of Defense Perry, “privatization-in-
place” keeps the “skilled workers at those bases there and 
working” by allowing private industry to perform the 
maintenance workload at the closed depots (Hellman, 2001; 
Warren, 1996).  To limit the adverse impact on the local 
communities, President Clinton specifically directed that 
BRAC actions on McClellan and Kelly be delayed until 2001 
(Warren, 1996; GAO, 1996b).  The White House maintained 
unusual oversight of the “privatization-in-place” plan 
through special meetings and memos (Spence, 1998; Druyun, 
1998; Peters, 1998).  As a result, Congress felt Clinton 
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broke the rules by picking two of the “biggest political 
plums” from an “all or nothing” BRAC list  (Lockwood, 2002; 
Kitfield, 1998a; BRAC Report, 1995, p. 5-2)5     
 
D. DEPOT DEBATE 
The “privatization-in-place” plan produced a hostile 
war on Capitol Hill between the Clinton Administration and 
the “powerful Depot Caucus” (Kitfield, 1998b).  The 
President’s handling of the BRAC process not only raised 
“serious bipartisan concerns” with Congress, but united 50-
plus legislators from Georgia, Okalahoma, and Utah whose 
depots stood to receive billions of dollars from the 
transfer of work from the McClellan and Kelly Depots 
(Spence, 1998; Kitfield, 1998b).  Reporting to Congress, 
GAO revealed that “Privatization-in-place eliminates the 
opportunity to consolidate workloads at the remaining 
centers” and will not “achieve substantial economy of scale 
savings and other efficiencies” (Nunn, 1997; GAO, 1996b).   
The success and questioned legality of “privatization-
in-place” rested on having a competitive private sector 
company bid and win the California and Texas depot 
workloads (Peters, 1998; Hansen, 1998a; House Report 104-
220, 1995).  When it appeared that Lockheed Martin, based 
in California, wasn’t bidding for the workload at the 
closing depots, the White House expressed unusual concern 
and held a special meeting with the acting Secretary of the 
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5 An April 26 memo from Secretary Peters (obtained by Rep. James 
Hansen) was judged by Congress as the “smoking gun” that proved “the 
White House compromised the integrity of the base closure process” 
(Costa, 1998; Spence, 1998). 
Air Force (Peters, 1998).  Congress immediately questioned 
“White House interest in such an arcane defense issue” 
(Spence, 1998).   
The Depot Caucus became angrier when the Air Force 
announced it would “bundle” the entire workload at 
McClellan and offer it as a single package (Kitfield, 
1998b).  Although the larger defense companies prefer 
bundling because it allows costs to be spread over a larger 
workload, it significantly decreased the opportunity for 
the remaining three depots to receive the contract  (Riley, 
1998; Kreisher, 1998).  The Department of Defense argued, 
“certain individual depot level maintenance and repair 
workloads could not be logically and economically executed 
unless they were bundled” (Spence, 1998; GAO, 1998a).  
However, GAO concluded that DOD failed to provide adequate 
documentation and support for depot bundling (Spence, 1998; 
GAO, 1998a).   
Many in Congress believed bundling was “a scheme 
specifically designed to keep contracts out of public 
depots and to allow private contractors to perform the work 
at the closing bases” (Kitfield, 1998a).  Surveying the 
depot battles, one senior Lockheed executive stated, “this 
controversy over the depots is, without question, the most 
divisive defense issue I've ever witnessed” (Kitfield, 
1998a).  However, many in Congress felt the evolving 
controversy wasn’t “limited to politics and [the] substance 
of depot maintenance” but centered on “damage [to] an 
already deeply strained working relationship between the 
executive and legislative branches” (Spence, 1998; Warner, 
1997).       
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E. POLITICAL FALLOUT 
Congressional resentment over the Clinton 
Administration’s intervention in base closures persisted 
until the end of his second term and remained the primary 
reason for congressional opposition to any new BRAC rounds 
(Lockwood, 2002; Lott, 2001a).  Congress felt the base 
closure “collusion between the White House, the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Air Force 
[was] outrageous, unethical and potentially illegal” 
(Costa, 1998; House Report 104-220, 1995).  Congress 
believed the Administration violated the integrity of the 
BRAC process, and until trust was completely restored, 
there was “very little support in the Congress for another 
round of base closings” (Hefley, 1998; Chambliss, 1997a; 
Smith, 1998).  When asked about future base closures, the 
Chairman of the House National Security Committee stated: 
I frankly don't see how, or why, Congress would 
approve authority for the administration to close 
more bases in light of the politics the President 
imposed upon the 1995 base closure process, a 
process that had been devoid of politics up until 
that time (Berenson, 1997). 
With BRAC politically broken, lower than expected savings, 
and skyrocketing environmental clean up costs, Congress 





IV. BASE CLOSING: 1997 TO 2001   
A. INTRODUCTION 
Every year from 1997 to 2001, Secretary of Defense 
William Cohen informed Congress of the Department of 
Defense’s (DoD) need to eliminate unneeded bases (Cohen, 
1997a; Annual Report, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001).  
Additionally, congressionally mandated reviews confirmed 
the Defense Secretary’s claim that DoD possessed from 13 to 
23 percent excess base structure (QDR, 1997, 2001; BRAC 
Report, 1995, 1998).6  Moreover, base closures were saving 
DoD $14 billion by 2001 (BRAC Report, 1998).  The 
Congressional Research Service (CRS), Congressional Budget 
Office, (CBO) and the General Accounting Office (GAO) all 
confirmed DoD’s findings concerning excess infrastructure 
and estimated BRAC savings (Lockwood 2002; Siehl, 1997b; 
CBO, 1998; GAO, 1998b, 1998c).  However, Congress refused 
to authorize another BRAC round (Lockwood, 2002).   
Although continually arguing that Clinton had 
“poisoned the well,” BRAC opponents also noted that BRAC 
devastated local communities and failed to produce savings 
because of the significant closing and environmental 
restoration costs (Kitfield, 1997; Roberts, 1998; Cohen, 
1999, 2000; Smith, 1998; Mitchell, 1999; GAO, 1998c, 2002).  
The previous chapter reviewed the Clinton Administration’s 
involvement in the 1995 BRAC process; this chapter reviews 
the controversy surrounding community economic impact, BRAC 
costs and savings, and environmental restoration costs.   
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6 The 1997 QDR reported DoD needed two additional rounds of BRAC 
similar in size to the 1993 (six percent) and 1995 (seven percent) 
rounds (QDR, 1997, p. VIII; BRAC Report, 1995). 
B. BRAC REQUESTS: 1997-2000 
In Presidential Power, Neustadt advised that a 
President must balance “an operation that proves manageable 
to the men who must administer it, acceptable to those who 
must support it, [and] tolerable to those who must put up 
with it, in Washington and out” (Neustadt, 1990, p. 155).  
Neustadt counseled, “Timing can be crucial for support and 
acquiescence” (Neustadt, 1990, p. 155).  The timing for a 
new BRAC Round during the Clinton Administration remained 
“the wrong time, wrong message” (Snowe, 1999).  
Secretary of Defense Cohen, attempting to persuade 
those in Congress who were saying “that the time for BRAC 
is not yet right,” countered by exclaiming, “There will 
never be a right time to take up base closures” (BRAC 
Report, 1998).  Congress made the Secretary’s statement a 
prediction, even though the previous Defense Secretary, 
William Perry, had also told Congress “quite candidly that 
there’s still some more [excess bases] that could be taken 
out if we had an additional round of BRAC, but it would be 
painful” (Perry, 1996).  Moreover, the 1995 BRAC Commission 
felt another BRAC round was necessary, recommending “that 
the Congress authorize another Base Closure Commission for 
the year 2001” (BRAC Report, 1995, p. 3-2).  The Pentagon 
stressed that the Quadrennial Defense Review’s (QDR) 
“fundamental and comprehensive examination of America’s 
defense needs from 1997 to 2015,” confirmed “DoD has enough 
excess base structure to warrant two additional rounds of 
BRAC,” and that it is “absolutely critical” that DoD reduce 
“not only bases and other supporting facilities, but also 
the laboratories and test ranges which support research, 
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development, test, and evaluation” (QDR, 1997, Sect.VIII; 
Annual Report, 2000, Ch.15).  In essence, DoD possessed 23 
percent too much base capacity (BRAC Report, 1998). 7   
From 1997 to 2001, Secretary of Defense Cohen 
“indicated every year” DoD’s need “to divest itself of non-
critical excess capacity,” and explained to Congress, 
“We’re carrying extra weight” (Annual Report, 1998, 1999, 
2000, 2001, pp. ix, 213; Cohen, 1997a).  The Defense 
Secretary noted that since 1985, defense spending has been 
reduced by 40 percent, DoD force structure compressed by 
one-third, yet Congress has reduced DoD infrastructure by 
only 21 percent (Cohen, 1997a).  Clearly desiring base 
closures, the Pentagon declared that “the BRAC process is a 
proven, effective tool” (BRAC Report, 1998, p. iv).  Except 
for delaying the start of the BRAC process by two months, 
DoD proposed using “essentially the same procedures that 
were used in the 1995 BRAC round” for new BRAC rounds in 
2001 and 2005 (BRAC Report, 1998, p. iv).  However, and 
perhaps in exasperation, Secretary Cohen suggested to his 
former Senate colleagues, that if Congress was “unhappy 
with the way in which the BRAC process was carried out,” 
they should “change the law” (Cohen, 1998, 1997b; SecDefs, 
2002b).  However, the Chairman of the Senate Armed Service 
Committee, Senator John Warner, gave an early but final 
decision on any new BRAC rounds during the Clinton 
Administration: 
I frankly don't see any means that we could 
succeed [with] any of the [BRAC] proposals that 
have surfaced.  This is not the time -- I repeat, 
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7 The 2001 QDR reported that DoD maintains between 20 and 25 percent 
excess infrastructure (QDR, 2001). 
not the time -- for the Senate to take up base 
closing legislation (Bradley, 1998).  
Congress claimed there were several reasons why now was 
“not the time” to authorize base closures (Bradley, 1998). 
    
C. ECONOMIC IMPACT ON BRAC COMMUNITIES 
In Congress and the Bureaucracy: A Theory of 
Influence, R. Douglas Arnold explained that, “Congressmen 
have little choice but to work to protect the military 
installations in their districts, because local 
beneficiaries see such installations as semi-permanent 
benefits” (Arnold, 1979, p. 101).  Reciprocally, once 
“communities acquire military installations, they grow 
accustomed to receiving continuous flows of federal funds” 
(Arnold, 1979, p. 101).  In summary, Congress was acutely 
aware of their constituents’ “grass-roots” opposition to 
future base closings (Roberts, 1998; Cohen, 1999, 2000; 
Smith, 1998; Mitchell, 1999).  Moreover, BRAC opponents 
claimed the advertised BRAC savings didn’t outweigh the job 
loss and disruption caused to local communities (Taylor, 
1997b; Roberts, 1998; Smith, 1998; Mitchell, 1999; GAO, 
1998c, 2002).   
Many in Congress opposed another BRAC round because of 
the widespread fear held by their constituents concerning 
future base closings (Lockwood, 2002; GAO, 1998c).  
Although base closures resulted in the loss of thousands of 
jobs, in some cases, the resulting panic from the 
announcement of an impending closure created a more severe 
economic impact than the closure itself (GAO, 1998c).  Not 
wanting their communities in “BRAC purgatory,” Congress 
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hunted for “a way of somehow minimizing the cost and 
expense to communities,” “anything to prevent national 
hysteria” (Roberts, 1998; Smith, 1999; Cohen, 1999; 
Thurmond, 1998, p. 4).8  However, many worries were 
unwarranted since BRAC studies revealed that most 
communities rebounded economically from base closures (GAO, 
1998b, 1998c, 2001c; BRAC Report, 1998).   
As early as 1996, the Rand National Defense Research 
Institute concluded that “while some of the communities did 
indeed suffer, the effects were not catastrophic [and] not 
nearly as severe as forecasted” (Dardia, 1996, p. xii).  
The Rand Institute calculated that many of the “noticeable 
effects” of base closures were “relatively localized” and 
were “at least partly offset by other economic factors” 
(Dardia, 1996, p. xii).  The Congressional Research Service 
also determined “that most of the 163 localities affected 
by the base closure and realignment decisions of the 1988, 
1991, 1993, and 1995 rounds have a relatively low degree of 
economic vulnerability to job losses” (Siehl, 1997a, p. 
16).  Highlighting its work “to help BRAC communities 
create jobs,” DoD assured Congress that at bases closed 
more than two years, 75 percent of the civilian jobs lost 
had already been replaced (BRAC Report, 1998, p. 55).  In 
its analysis, CBO observed, “the economic impact of base 
closures on communities depended on many factors, including 
the size and strength of the local economy and whether the 
community is urban or rural (CBO, 1998, p. 8).   
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8 To limit public anxiety, some members even suggested DoD create “a 
list of bases” that would be off limits for base closure consideration 
(Hefley, 2000, 2001; McHugh, 2000; “Cohen mulls,” 1999). 
In concurrence with CBO, GAO stressed in 1998 through 
2002 that “the strength of the national economy and the 
level of economic diversity in the affected communities 
played a strong role in determining how well” a community 
survived a base closure (GAO, 1998b, p. 12, 2002).  GAO 
also asserted that “successful redevelopment of base 
property” served a significant function in economic 
recovery (GAO, 2001c, p. 1).  After detailed analyses, GAO 
concluded that seven factors affect economic recovery: (1) 
the national economy; (2) the diversification of the local 
economy; (3) regional trends; (4) public confidence; (5) 
government assistance; (6) natural and labor resources; and 
(7) reuse of base property (GAO, 1998c). 
 
Figure 1. Seven Factors Affecting Economic Recovery 
(GAO, 1998c).   
 
 
In 2001, GAO reported that, “prior studies and the 
studies of others indicate that over time many communities 
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have absorbed the economic losses [and] most communities 
are recovering from the economic impacts of base closures” 
(GAO, 2001c, p. 4).  Summarizing for Congress, the 
Congressional Research Service concluded that “emerging 
experience indicates that more jobs, not less, follow many, 
but not all, closures” (Siehl, 1997b, p. 16).  Nonetheless, 
before causing even temporary job loss and disruption in 
their districts, Congress needed convincing evidence that 
BRAC savings were substantial and real (National Defense, 
1997; GAO, 1998c, 2002). 
   
D. QUESTIONING BRAC COSTS AND SAVINGS 
Congress repeatedly questioned DoD concerning the 
expected BRAC costs and realized savings (Roberts, 1997; 
Taylor, 1997a; GAO, 1996a, 1998c, 2001b).  Imprecise 
responses by DoD led many in Congress to believe more time 
was needed to “effectively understand the total cost” and 
“determine the exact savings from [the] previous rounds” of 
base closures (Allen, 1997; Thurmond, 1998, p. 4; GAO, 
2002).  Congress also believed that: 
the alleged [BRAC] savings were not going to go 
to procurement, modernization, quality of life 
and readiness.  They were going to go to more and 
more of the various missions that some of us 
think are not involved in our national security.  
...i.e. Bosnia (Roberts, 1998; Smith, 1998). 
Congressional displeasure deepened, as DoD officials 
continually testified that BRAC costs and savings remained 
difficult to quantify (Inhofe, 1998; Goodman, 1998). 
However, DoD defended its position throughout the 
years by arguing that BRAC costs and savings  
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by their very nature,...are subject to some 
uncertainty.  The Department reallocates expected 
BRAC savings through numerous decisions made as 
part of the normal process of planning, 
programming, and budgeting.  No audit trail, 
single document, or budget account exists for 
tracking the end use of each dollar saved through 
BRAC (BRAC Report, 1998, pp. v-vi).  
Nonetheless, DoD told Congress it was “committed to 
improving its estimates of costs and savings in future BRAC 
rounds” (BRAC Report 1998, p. vi).   
The Pentagon asserted that because “budget estimates 
have changed does not mean that BRAC costs are out of 
control or that costs will grow so large as to cancel 
savings” (BRAC Report, 1998, p. 33).9  In fact, the Pentagon 
reported that since 1998, BRAC costs now equal BRAC 
savings, (Figure 2) and by 2001, DoD will save $14 billion 
in reduced infrastructure costs (BRAC Report, 1998).10   
 
Figure 2. Reported BRAC Costs & Savings (GAO, 1998c). 
                      9 The unexpected costs of environmental restoration, and unrealized 
government land sale revenues delayed the realization of BRAC savings 
by several years (Warren, 1997a; CBO, 1996). 
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10 GAO now estimates BRAC net savings to be $16.7 billion through 
fiscal year 2001 (GAO, 2002). 
The Pentagon’s difficulty in assessing and reporting 
BRAC costs and savings concerned two aspects of measurement 
(Lockwood, 2001).  The first involved complex data 
collection and confirmation of statistical accuracy 
(Warren, 1997a; Lockwood, 2001; CBO, 1998).11  The second 
concerned the “need to disentangle the effects of BRAC and 
non-BRAC factors on [complex] expenditures,” such as 
relocating personnel and equipment, constructing new 
facilities to accommodate transferred operations at gaining 
bases, and environmental restoration (Lockwood, 2001; CBO, 
1998, p. 6; GAO, 2001b).12   
The 105th Congress, greatly concerned about “the costs 
and savings attributable to the [four] rounds of base 
closures,” required DoD to produce an extensive study 
concerning BRAC savings (National Defense, 1997).  The 
National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 1998, 
directed DoD to submit a meticulous accounting of the 
“actual costs and savings” associated with BRAC (National 
Defense, 1997).13  Almost a year in advance of the 
congressional deadline, and providing “most, but not all, 
of the information required,” DoD submitted its BRAC status 
                     11 The Pentagon’s inability to recover the base closure estimates 
originally presented to the BRAC Commissions significantly complicated 
BRAC costs and savings measurement (Lockwood, 2001; CBO, 1998). 
12 Additionally, there is uncertainty associated with the projected 
personnel reductions attributed solely to BRAC during the Cold War 
drawdown (CBO, 1998; BRAC 1998, p. 49; Lockwood, 2002, p. 3; Baucus, 
2001; Stevens, 2001; Tapp, 2001). 
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13 Incidentally, among the 11 required “elements” of the Defense Act, 
Congress insisted DoD provide a list of each military installation with 
300 or more civilian personnel, the current excess capacity at each 
installation, and the types of military bases recommended for closure 
or realignment (National Defense, 1997; GAO, 1998b). 
report to Congress in April 1998 (BRAC Report, 1998; GAO, 
1998b, p. 4; CBO, 1998).14  
In the 1998 BRAC report, Secretary of Defense Cohen 
stressed that “the past four rounds of BRAC are already 
generating substantial savings” (BRAC Report, 1998).  The 
Secretary claimed BRAC savings would total $14 billion 
through 2001, and beginning in 2002, projected recurring 
savings of $5.6 billion annually (BRAC Report, 1998).15  
Analyses of DoD’s findings by CBO and GAO concluded that 
even though specific estimates by DoD were uncertain and 
“relatively weak,” the BRAC rounds produced substantial 
savings (CBO, 1996, 1998, p. 8; GAO, 1996a, 1998b, 2002; 
BRAC Report, 1998).   
After analyzing DoD’s 1998 BRAC report, CBO claimed 
DoD’s savings estimates were “reasonable,” but stressed 
that DoD’s approximations were “based on the same 
undocumented estimates of personnel reductions that the 
defense agencies and military departments use in their BRAC 
budgets (CBO, 1998, p. 3).  Moreover, CBO reminded Congress 
that reductions in personnel costs account for over 80 
percent of the estimated BRAC savings, especially important 
since Congress questioned the validity of DoD’s premise 
that a one-to-one correlation should exist between end-
strength reductions and base closings (CBO, 1998; Lockwood, 
2002).  In short, CBO confirmed that the precise measures 
for determining BRAC savings “do not—and indeed cannot—
exist” (CBO, 1998, p. 2).  The Congressional Budget Office 
explained: 
                     14 The 1998 DoD BRAC report contained 1,800 pages of detailed 
supporting material (Levin, 2001d). 
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BRAC savings are really avoided costs.  Because 
those avoided costs are not actual expenditures, 
DoD cannot observe them and record them in its 
financial records.  As a result, DoD can only 
estimate savings rather than actually measure 
them (CBO, 1998, p. 7; Lockwood, 2002). 
Although in agreement with CBO’s and DoD’s findings, 
GAO was more critical of DoD’s failure to “capture all 
savings associated with BRAC actions” (GAO, 1998b, p. 2).  
GAO reported that “because of data and records weaknesses,” 
BRAC “savings estimates are imprecise and should be viewed 
as rough approximations” rather than precise accounting 
(GAO, 1998b, p. 2, 2002, p. 2).  Additionally, GAO noted 
DoD didn’t have a separate method or data system to track 
BRAC savings (GAO, 1998b, 2001b).  In fact, GAO 
reemphasized the Pentagon’s need to establish and maintain 
“a clear and consistent process for updating” BRAC savings 
estimates DoD wide, especially if the Pentagon wanted to 
avoid “the subsequent erosion of credibility” (GAO, 1997, 
1998b, p. 7, 2002, p. 37; Warren, 1997a).  Nonetheless, GAO 
concurred that although BRAC savings are imprecise, they 
are substantial (GAO, 1998b, 2002).  As a result, GAO, DoD, 
CBO, and CRS all presented Congress with the consistent 
message that even with considerable implementation costs, 
and rough accounting approximations, BRAC produced savings 
(GAO, 1998b, 2002; BRAC Report, 1998; CBO, 1998; Lockwood, 
2001). 
In July 2001, GAO asserted that years of analyses 
consistently confirmed that BRAC savings were substantial, 
once initial investment costs were recouped (GAO, 1998b, 
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15 Updated projections predict recurring savings of $6.6 billion 
annually (GAO, 2002). 
2001b).  Moreover, GAO outlined the arguments that could be 
made to show how BRAC savings “could be more or less than 
reported” (GAO, 2001b, p. 3).  Summarizing these arguments, 
GAO explained that these positions center on whether or 
not: (1) all federal expenditures attributable to base 
closures were included; (2) if new military construction 
would have occurred to accommodate transferring personnel 
and operations at gaining bases; and  (3) if environmental 
restoration costs attributed to base closures would have 
occurred (GAO, 2001b).  After thorough audit evaluation, 
GAO asserted, “these factors are not significant enough to 
outweigh the fact that substantial savings are being 
generated from the closure process” (GAO, 2001b, p. 10).   
Nonetheless, many BRAC opponents still declared, DoD 
will fail to see significant BRAC savings because 
environmental cleanup is time-consuming, dynamic, and an 
extremely expensive process (Taylor, 1997b; Inhofe, 1998; 
Warren, 1997a; GAO, 1998c).  Moreover, communities suffer 
because they must wait years before they can reuse the base 
property for economic recovery (Siehl, 1997a; GAO, 1998c, 
2002)    
 
E. BASE REUSE AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT  
Community leaders have two priorities during a base 
closure conversion: replacing the loss of jobs, and 
sustaining their community’s quality of life (Siehl, 
1997a).  Knowing that their communities view a base closure 
“as a punishment, not merely a disappointment,” Congress 
sought to reduce any impediments to base re-use/conversion 
(Arnold, 1979, p. 101; Siehl, 1997a).  Additionally, GAO 
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asserted that redevelopment of base property functioned as 
a catalyst for economic recovery within the surrounding 
community (GAO, 1998c, 2002).   
Preparing property for transfer and reuse by the local 
community and other agencies involved cleaning up 
environmental contamination resulting from years of 
military use (GAO, 1998c).  The BRAC Commission “found that 
achieving sufficient environmental cleanup in a timely 
fashion presents one of the greatest obstacles in the 
entire reuse process” (BRAC Report, 1995 p. 2-5).  The 
Pentagon also cited environmental cleanup concerns as the 
primary reason for property transfer delays (GAO, 1998c, 
2002).   
As a result, the Fast-Track Cleanup program was 
established in FY1993 to expedite cleanup and help promote 
the transfer of BRAC property (GAO, 1998c).  The main 
advantage of early transfer authority was that it allowed 
DOD to make property available to the user as soon as 
possible, and allowed environmental cleanup to proceed 
concurrently (GAO, 2002).  However, compliance with 
stringent federal and state environmental cleanup standards 
remained the leading cause for delaying the base conversion 
process (GAO, 1998c; Lockwood, 2001).   
The Department of Defense manages six environmental 
programs (Figure 3)  (Bearden, 1999).  Environmental 
Compliance, Operational Installations & Formerly Used 
Defense Sites (FUDS) Cleanup, and Base Closure Cleanup are 
the most costly (Bearden, 2002).  Although BRAC closures 
are funded through a special account established by the 
Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, DoD assured 
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Congress that “the vast majority of environmental 
restoration costs would be incurred whether or not an 
installation is impacted by BRAC” (Siehl, 1997a; Defense 
BRAC Act, 1990; BRAC Report, 1998, p. 35).  Funding for 
mandatory cleanup of FUDS and active installations has 
varied from $150 million in fiscal year 1984 to a high of 
$1.96 billion in fiscal year 1994 (Bearden, 2002).  
Similarly, funding for BRAC cleanup has varied from $100 
million in fiscal year 1991 to a high of $860 million in 
fiscal year 1998 (Bearden, 2002).  In 1995, the BRAC 
Commission concluded that “Clearly, environmental cleanup 
is very costly” (BRAC Report, 1995, p. 2-5). 
 
Figure 3. FY2002 Spending Requests for Defense Cleanup 




Of the $23 billion estimated cost for the entire BRAC 
program through 2001, over $7 billion, (31 percent) is 
spent on environmental restoration (GAO, 1998c; 2001c).  
The major factors contributing to the high cost and delay 
of cleanup were: (1) the large number of contaminated 
sites; (2) federal and state regulations; and (3) the 
intended property reuse (GAO, 1998c; BRAC Report, 1995).  
CBO explained that the cost and delay of environmental 
cleanup was due to the extensive environmental 
contamination of the closed bases, and that several bases 
known as “Superfund” sites posed such a great “risk to 
public health and the environment” that they were placed on 
the National Priorities List (CBO, 1996; Bearden, 2002, p. 
3).  However, in 2002, GAO declared that “although 
estimated environmental costs have fluctuated over 
time...the total expected costs of about $10.5 billion are 
still within the range of the projected [cleanup] costs 
estimated in 1996” (GAO, 2002, p. 3).  Two of the most 
difficult and expensive aspects of environmental cleanup 
are polluted ground water and unexploded ordnance (CBO, 
1996). 
Although DOD reported progress in achieving cleanup 
milestones in 1998, GAO noted that environmental 
restoration is difficult to predict (GAO, 1998c).  In fact, 
the Air Force estimated it would take decades to remedy the 
extensive groundwater contamination at a third of its 
closed bases, with some bases requiring monitoring and 
actions extending to 2069 (GAO, 1998c).  In 1998, GAO 
warned that unexploded ordnance (UXO) cleanup remained a 
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major cost not included in DoD’s BRAC estimates (GAO, 
1998c, p. 50, 2001c; Bearden, 2002).16 
In 2001, GAO estimated that cleanup of DoD’s closed, 
transferred, and transferring training ranges may be as low 
as $14 billion, but could exceed $100 billion (GAO, 2001a).  
Consequently, DOD defended its process of excluding 
environmental costs in its BRAC decision-making model, 
arguing that the “inclusion of environmental restoration 
costs in the BRAC analysis might result in an installation 
being retained because of high cleanup costs [possibly 
creating] a perverse incentive” to pollute (BRAC Report, 
1998, p. 32).  Nonetheless, DoD proposed to have “remedy in 
place” (RIP) or “response complete” (RC) in all of the BRAC 
installations by the end of fiscal year 2005 (GAO, 1998c; 
DERP, 2002).  This proposal gave DoD a better rationale for 
convincing Congress to authorize a BRAC round in 2005. 
 
Figure 4. Cleanup Status at Base Closure Sites as of 
September 30, 2000 (Bearden, 2002).  
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16 GAO reports UXO remains a “potentially costly and unresolved 
problem” with FUDS and BRAC bases (GAO, 1998c, p. 50, 2001c; Bearden, 
2002). 
With each congressional request, the Pentagon produced 
clear evidence that DoD possessed excess bases and that 
BRAC produced savings (BRAC Report, 1995, 1998; QDR, 
1997).17  Moreover, study after study indicated that most 
communities recover from the economic impact of base 
closures (GAO, 1998c, 2001c, p. 4; Siehl, 1997a, 1997b; 
Dardia, 1996; BRAC Report, 1998).  The Congressional 
Research Service, Congressional Budget Office, and the 
General Accounting Office all confirmed DoD’s findings 
concerning excess base structure and estimated BRAC savings 
(Lockwood 2002; Siehl, 1997b; CBO, 1998; GAO, 1998, 2001c).  
However, Congress refused to authorize base closures 
(Lockwood, 2002).  It would take more convincing from a new 
presidential administration, political compromise, and the 
crisis of September 11th before Congress would consider 
another BRAC round (S.1438, 2001). 
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V. BRAC 2005  
A. INTRODUCTION 
On 28 June 2001, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
notified the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) that a 
“rationalization and restructuring of DoD infrastructure 
was needed” and under DoD’s “Efficient Facilities 
Initiative, a 20-25% reduction in excess military bases and 
facilities could generate savings of several billion 
dollars annually” (Rumsfeld, 2001b).  Secretary Rumsfeld 
declared that “one way that Congress could help us [the new 
Bush Administration] ...is to authorize additional BRAC 
rounds” (Rumsfeld, 2001a).  
In The Politics of Shared Power: Congress and the 
Executive, Louis Fisher declares, “very few operations of 
Congress and the Presidency are genuinely independent and 
autonomous” (Fisher, 1998, p. XI).  Fisher maintains “an 
initiative by one branch sets in motion a series of 
compensatory actions by the other branch--sometimes of a 
cooperative nature, sometimes antagonistic” (p. XI).  The 
Bush Administration’s Efficient Facilities Initiative (EFI) 
set in motion a number of congressional actions that 
ultimately led to approval of a base closure round in 2005 
(Else, 2001).   
 
B. BUSH ADMINISTRATION PROPOSAL 
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On 28 February 2001, the Bush Administration outlined 
its budget proposal in “A Blueprint for New Beginnings: A 
Responsible Budget for America’s Priorities” (A Blueprint, 
2001).  In the “President’s Message” to Congress, Mr. Bush 
stressed, “New threats to our national security...demand a 
rethinking of our defense priorities, our force structure, 
and our military technology” (A Blueprint, 2001, p. 3).  
President Bush argued that his Administration’s “new 
approach begins the work of restoring our military” to meet 
the emerging threats of a new century (A Blueprint, 2001, 
pp. 3, 53).  The President informed Congress that the 
Administration would examine and scrutinize the 
capabilities and structure of the U.S. armed forces, but 
emphasized that several DoD reforms were immediately needed 
(A Blueprint, 2001, pp. 53, 101).  Stating that “DOD wastes 
money on infrastructure it does not need,” the report 
declared “it is clear that new rounds of base closures will 
be necessary to shape the military more efficiently” 
(Blueprint, 2001, p. 101).   
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The DoD’s Efficient Facilities Initiative (EFI) 
outlined the Bush Administration’s plan to reshape the 
military and “transform its facilities to meet the 
challenges of the new century” (EFI, 2001a, 2001b p. 12; 
Blueprint, 2001, p. 101; QDR, 2001).  EFI (DoD’s new name 
for BRAC) called for improving and amending the Defense 
Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 to authorize a 
single round of base closures and realignments in 2003 
(DuBois, 2001; EFI, 2001a).  Secretary Rumsfeld declared 
that “after a great deal of consultation on the Hill, ...a 
single round would be better than two or three or [even] 
five” (Rumsfeld, 2001d).  Echoing Congressman Hansen’s 
often repeated BRAC analogy, Secretary Rumsfeld stated that 
conducting more than a single base closure round, is “akin 
to cutting a dog's tail off one inch at a time hoping it 
doesn't hurt so much” (Rumsfeld, 2001d; Hansen, 1998a, 
1998b).  The Defense Secretary added, “we’re going to do it 
once, [and] we’re going to try to do it right” (Rumsfeld, 
2001d).  “To do it right,” and using an “ongoing DoD 
consultation process,” the Pentagon drafted an EFI 
legislative proposal for Congress (EFI, 2001a, p. 1, 
2001b).       
The EFI legislative proposal possessed three major 
components: 1) Authorization of a single round of base 
closure in 2003 using existing BRAC law as the framework; 
2) improving the base closure process; and 3) incorporating 
local communities into the BRAC process such as the 
partnership at Brooks Air Force Base in San Antonio, Texas 
where DoD conveyed the base to San Antonio and then leased 
back portions of the installation to maintain its mission  
(EFI, 2001a, 2001b; DuBois, 2001). 
The Pentagon’s legislative proposal to Congress 
suggested using the previous BRAC process as the framework 
for closing and realigning bases in 2003 (EFI, 2001b; 
DuBois, 2001).  In the EFI process, DoD presented a 
worldwide, comprehensively evaluated infrastructure plan 
that would demonstrate “military value” to an independent 
EFI Commission by March 14, 2003 (EFI, 2001a, 2001b).  The 
EFI Commission will review DoD’s infrastructure plan, and 
with authority to change DoD’s recommendations, send its 
“own recommendations” to the President by July 7, 2003 
(Aldridge 2001; EFI, 2001a, 2001b).  The President has two 
weeks to accept the Commission’s recommendations in their 
entirety (“all or none”) and forward the list to Congress 
(EFI, 2001a).  If the President chooses to reject the list, 
he can require the EFI Commission to present a revised list 
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by August 18, 2003 (EFI, 2001a).  The President also has 
the option of terminating the base closing process by 
rejecting the list a second time (EFI, 2001a).  If the 
President accepts the recommendations, he then forwards the 
list to Congress by September 3, 2003 (EFI, 2001a).  Like 
the 1990 BRAC law, the EFI proposal requires Congress to 
either accept the list in its entirety, or pass a Joint 
Resolution rejecting the Commission’s recommendations in 
their entirety (EFI, 2001a; Defense BRAC Act, 1990). 
The Pentagon sought to validate EFI as a comprehensive 
review of the number and type of bases needed for “the U.S. 
military to match facilities to forces” in a newly defined 
national military strategy (Towell, 2001b; Aldridge, 2001; 
EFI, 2001a, 2001b; Rumsfeld, 2001c; QDR, 2001, p. 55).  
Stressing “military value” as the “principal consideration 
in the selection of facilities to be closed or realigned,” 
the EFI proposal stated, “all military installations will 
be reviewed” (EFI, 2001b, pp. 3-4; EFI, 2001a, p. 2).  In 
essence, EFI proposed the infrastructure evaluation of all 
U.S. military bases in relation to the availability of DoD 
installations worldwide (EFI, 2001a, 2001b).   
To ensure a comprehensive evaluation, the EFI process 
incorporated a “Review of Overseas Basing Requirements” in 
addition to the QDR of 2001 (EFI, 2001a, 2001b; Rumsfeld, 
2001c).  Additionally, Secretary Rumsfeld, suggesting that 
the 2001 QDR could change “overseas basing arrangements,” 
directed all geographic combatant commanders to submit 
their overseas basing plans six months after the QDR 
(Rumsfeld, 2001c; Aldridge, 2001).   
  52
Outlining differences between EFI and BRAC, the 
Pentagon also attempted to dissociate EFI from the 
estimated cost savings of prior BRAC rounds.  Responding to 
potential criticism that BRAC does not save money, Under 
Secretary of Defense Pete Aldridge claimed that the EFI 
effort “is really not a cost-savings effort.  It is focused 
on the proper infrastructure for supporting our military 
forces” (Aldridge, 2001).  However, Mr. Aldridge added that 
the EFI round could eventually result in cost savings of $7 
billion annually, $1 billion more than the $6 billion 
annual savings from all previous BRAC rounds (Aldridge, 
2001; McCain, 2001b; BRAC Report, 1998).18  In essence, DoD 
claimed the “military necessity” of matching force 
structure to infrastructure was the real value behind EFI 
(Dubois, 2001; Aldridge, 2001; EFI, 2001b).   
The Pentagon proposed other factors to examine during 
the base closure process (EFI, 2001a; Aldridge, 2001).  The 
Pentagon claimed EFI should consider consolidating military 
operations, combining research laboratories and test 
ranges, collocating government agencies, eliminating excess 
leased spaces, and realigning wartime basing requirements 
(EFI, 2001a; Aldridge, 2001).  EFI legislation also 
proposed reimbursement of Commissary surcharge and non-
appropriated Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) funds 
lost due to a base closure (EFI, 2001b).  The EFI proposed 
privatization-in-place, but only if it was determined to be 
cost-effective and specifically authorized by the EFI 
Commission (EFI, 2001a, 2001b).  The number of EFI 
commissioners was increased from eight to nine to eliminate 
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18 Additional testimony claimed EFI could “save an estimated $3.5 
billion annually” (QDR, 2001, p. 56; Rumsfeld, 2001a; EFI, 2001a). 
the possibility of a tied vote (EFI, 2001a).  The EFI 
legislation also proposed giving local communities a 
significant role in determining the future of a closed 
base, expediting environmental restoration while reducing 
cleanup costs, and reauthorizing early no-cost transfer to 
a redevelopment authority to stimulate the surrounding 
economy (EFI, 2001a).  Repeating the congressionally 
mandated 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review’s findings, Under 
Secretary Aldridge declared “EFI will encourage a 
cooperative effort between the President, the Congress, and 
the military and local communities to achieve the most 
effective and efficient base structure for America's Armed 
Forces” (QDR, 2001, p. 55; Aldridge, 2001).  The newly 
appointed Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee 
(SASC), Carl Levin, also encouraged cooperation in 
restructuring DoD’s base structure (Dewar, 2001; Ricks, 
2001; S.397, 2001). 
 
C. SENATE ACTION 
In May 2001, Senator James Jeffords officially 
announced his decision to leave the Republican Party (A. 
Taylor, 2001).  His decision transferred control of the 
Senate to the Democratic Party, which led to stark 
“differences in chairmanship leadership” (Dewar, 2001).  
Although there would be “repercussions down the line” for 
the Republican Administration, it increased DoD’s chances 
for obtaining base closure authorization when Senator Carl 
Levin became the Chairman of the SASC (Dewar, 2001; Ricks, 
2001; McCain, 2001c; Levin 2001d).        
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Beginning in 1997, Senator Carl Levin and Senator John 
McCain attempted to persuade Congress to pass legislation 
giving DoD authority to close excess bases (S.AMDT.705, 
1997; S.258, 1999; S.AMDT.393, 1999; S.AMDT.3197, 2000; 
McCain, 2001c; Levin, 2001d).  However, on 22 February 
2001, Mr. McCain and Mr. Levin introduced S.397, a bill to 
amend the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 
to authorize additional base closure rounds in 2003 and 
2005 (S.397, 2001; Levin, 2001a; McCain, 2001a).  Calling 
for BRAC rounds in 2003 and 2005, the legislation proposed 
following “the same procedures that were used in 1991, 1993 
and 1995, with two notable exceptions” (Levin, 2001a; 
S.397, 2001).   
Mr. Levin stated that the BRAC Commission process 
would start and finish two months later in the fiscal year 
than in previous BRAC rounds (Levin, 2001a).  Secondly, 
under S.397, “privatization-in-place would not be permitted 
at closing installations unless the Base Closure Commission 
expressly recommends it” (Levin, 2001a; S.397, 2001).19  The 
legislation also directed the Secretary of Defense to 
consider local government views in the preparation of the 
base closure list (McCain, 2001a). 
Mr. Levin stressed that the McCain-Levin bill retained 
the five key elements of the base closure process that GAO 
asserted “contributed to the success of prior rounds” 
(Levin, 2001a; GAO, 1998b, p. 13).  The five elements were: 
(1) an independent commission; (2) clearly articulated, 
published criteria; (3) certified and accurate data; (4) 
adherence to mandated time lines; and (5) presidential and 
                     
  55
19 DoD’s proposed EFI legislation incorporated the same time lines 
and privatization-in-place provision (EFI, 2001b). 
congressional acceptance or rejection of the BRAC list in 
its entirety (GAO, 1998b, p. 13).  Mr. Levin urged his 
“colleagues to support this legislation,” adding that S.397 
only authorizes, not requires DoD to close or realign its 
unneeded infrastructure (Levin, 2001a).  As Chairman of the 
SASC, Mr. Levin was in a powerful position to propose to 
Congress the need for base closure authorization (Arnold, 
1979; Ricks, 2001; Dewar, 2001).    
On May 24, 2001, Senator Levin, Senator Warner, and 
Secretary Rumsfeld held a press conference following a 
meeting concerning future defense issues (Levin, 2001b).  
During the press conference, Senator Levin reemphasized 
DoD’s need to save money on unneeded infrastructure so 
savings could be refocused on emerging “terrorist threats” 
(Levin, 2001b).  Mr. Levin also proclaimed he was “more 
optimistic” that base closing legislation would pass in 
2001 for a number of reasons (Levin, 2001b).20  The SASC 
Chairman stressed that the Bush Administration already 
“indicated that it will support another round or two of 
base closings” (Levin, 2001b).   
Additionally, Mr. Levin felt that the argument that 
“Clinton allegedly politicized” the BRAC process was no 
longer valid “now that there is a new [Republican] 
President, and now that that President supports one or two 
rounds of base closures” (Levin, 2001b).  The Democratic 
Senator further suggested that “with the Bush 
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20 Mr. Levin later retracted his optimism after Assistant Secretary 
of Defense Dubois publicly speculated bases in Norfolk Va. were likely 
closure candidates (Loeb, 2001; Lott, 2001a).  
Administration’s strong support there will be a number of 
additional Republicans who will now support base closures” 
(Levin, 2001b).   
Republican Senator Warner agreed, and stated that 
because “the President in the budget submission indicated 
his desire for a base closure,” he “would support the 
legislation forthcoming” (Warner, 2001a, 2001b).  However, 
Mr. Warner publicly disagreed with Mr. Levin on the issue 
of the number of base closure rounds (Warner, 2001a).   
Senator Warner argued that more than a single round is 
too much of an expense and burden for affected communities 
to bear (Warner, 2001a, 2001b).  Warner added, “I think we 
[should] do it one time, and I think we [should] do it 
thoroughly and as big as we feel in the Congress and the 
President [thinks] it is necessary, and put it behind us” 
(Warner, 2001a).  Immediately Mr. Levin publicly replied, I 
“accept one round if that's the best we can get” (Levin, 
2001b; Warner, 2001b).  Although it appeared Mr. Levin and 
Mr. Warner may have come to a prompt compromise, the rest 
of the U.S. Senate would not be so quick to agree.  
On June 10, 2001, while chairing the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, Senator Levin asked each Service 
Secretary and Service Chief, to respond directly to the 
following question: 
Do you agree with the President and Secretary 
Rumsfeld that we have unneeded bases and that we 
should have another round of base closures to 
eliminate the excess infrastructure...to free up 
resources for modernization or for other higher 
priorities (Levin, 2001c)?  
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Responding in the affirmative, the replies of the 
Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs ranged from “a BRAC 
would help,”  “yes,” and “absolutely yes,” (White, 2001; 
Jones, 2001; Ryan, 2001; Roche, 2001; Clark, 2001; England, 
2001; Shinseki, 2001).   
However, 47 Senators weren’t convinced DoD needed 
another base closure round (S.AMDT.1622, 2001).  Most 
Senators cited DoD’s inability to provide  “consistent and 
detailed [BRAC] savings” as their reason for opposing 
another BRAC round (Baucus, 2001; Bunning, 2001a, 2001b, 
2001c; Collins, 2001; Dorgan, 2001; Hatch, 2001; Hutchison, 
2001; Snowe, 2001a; Stevens, 2001; Lott, 2001a).  Senator 
Lott, the Republican minority leader, stated that BRAC 
“savings are of a very dubious nature” (Lott, 2001a).  
Additionally, Senators Baucus and Stevens raised concerns 
that the vast majority of savings came from personnel 
reductions during the Cold War drawdown, not base closures 
(Baucus, 2001; Stevens, 2001; CBO, 1998).  BRAC opponents 
also argued that the war on terrorism could require an 
increase in military personnel, and a subsequent need for 
facilities formerly considered excess (Baucus, 2001; 
Stevens, 2001; Snowe, 2001a).   
Declaring DoD was putting the “cart before the horse,” 
many BRAC opponents “strongly believe[d] that the events of 
September 11th changed this Nation's priorities,” and DoD 
should complete a new defense strategy review before 
Congress authorizes a base closure round (Nelson, 2001; 
Lott, 2001a, 2001b; Snowe, 2001a, 2001b; Baucus, 2001; 
Bingaman, 2001; Bunning, 2001b; Collins, 2001; Dorgan, 
2001; Hatch, 2001; Inhofe, 2001).  Citing the softening 
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economy since September 11th, BRAC opponents suggested 
postponing base closures (Dorgan, 2001; Snowe, 2001a; Lott, 
2001a; Baucus, 2001).  In fact, Senators Lott and Bunning 
recommended eliminating the BRAC process altogether, 
suggesting that DoD close its bases “on a gradual basis,” 
especially when DoD was “going to blow the budget out of 
the water just to take care of future needs 20 years down 
the pike” (Bunning, 2001a; Lott, 2001a).   
Likewise, Senator Cleland claimed there were a “number 
of things the military can do to streamline its 
infrastructure, without closing bases wholesale here in the 
United States” (Cleland, 2001).  Mr. Cleland reasserted his 
long held belief that DoD should close a significant number 
of bases in both Korea and Europe instead (Cleland, 1997, 
2001).  Mr. Lott concurred (Lott, 2001a).  Quite simply, 
many in the Senate felt that this was not “the time to cut 
bases and to reduce our military infrastructure;” Congress 
should “postpone” considering any base closures until after 
2003, and only after DoD analyzed “how to fight the first 
war of the 21st century” (Bunning, 2001b; Inhofe, 2001; 
S.AMDT.1622, 2001).  
In rebuttal, both the Chairman, and ranking minority 
member of the SASC reiterated that for years the President 
and DoD have “pleaded with us [Congress] to allow them to 
get rid of excess structure” (Levin, 2001d; Warner, 2001c).  
Mr. Levin agreed that September 11th changed the nation's 
priorities but disagreed with the view that “now is not the 
time” to authorize DoD to begin the BRAC process (Baucus, 
2001; Collins, 2001; Hatch, 2001; Lott, 2001a; Levin, 
2001d).  Confirming DoD’s continued desire to reduce excess 
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infrastructure after September 11th, the SASC Chairman read 
a letter, dated 21 September 2001, from Secretary Rumsfeld:  
I write to underscore the importance we place on 
the Senate's approval of authority for a single 
round of base closures and realignments.  Indeed, 
in the wake of the terrible events of September 
11, the imperative to convert excess capacity 
into warfighting ability is enhanced, not 
diminished (Levin, 2001d; Warner, 2001c).21      
Regarding cost savings, many BRAC supporters argued 
that “GAO report after GAO report” confirms that BRAC 
produces billions in savings each year; Senator McCain 
simply stated, “the more bases you have, the more you have 
to spend.  We know that” (Levin, 2001d; McCain, 2001c; 
Warner, 2001c; Reed, 2001).  Finally, proponents stressed 
that the FY2002 Defense Authorization bill did “not mandate 
the establishment of a base realignment commission,” it 
only authorized DoD to begin the BRAC process, (Carper, 
2001; Warner, 2001c; Levin, 2001d; McCain, 2001c).  
Authorization for DoD to conduct a BRAC round in 2003 
passed the U.S. Senate by a margin of six votes 
(S.AMDT.1622, 2001).22   
The U.S. Senate version of the Defense Authorization 
bill for FY2002, (S.1416) later changed to S.1438, amended 
the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 to 
authorize a single base closure round in 2003 (S.1416, 
2001; S.1438, 2001).  Although authorizing the same 
procedures used in previous BRAC rounds, the bill contained 
                     21 Senator Warner requested that Mr. Rumsfeld submit the letter 
verifying the continued need for a BRAC round after the events of 
September 11th  (Warner, 2001c).  
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22 S.AMDT.1622, (Bunning Amendment) sought to strike the BRAC 
provision from the FY2002 Defense Authorization Act; the amendment vote 
was 53 to 47 (S.AMDT.1622, 2001; S.1416, 2001; S.1438, 2001). 
many, but not all, of DoD’s EFI proposals (S.1438, 2001; 
EFI, 2001b).23  The Bill directed DoD to conduct a 
worldwide, comprehensive evaluation, and stipulated “that 
military value [serve as]...the primary consideration in 
the making of recommendations for the closure or 
realignment of military installations” (S.1438, 2001; EFI, 
2001b, p. 4).  Following EFI’s timelines, the bill 
rescheduled the process to begin later in the fiscal year 
and set the number of BRAC commissioners to nine (S.1438, 
2001; EFI, 2001b).  The bill included a provision to 
consider local government views, but curiously excluded 
legislation addressing the issue of privatization-in-place 
(S.1438, 2001; EFI, 2001b).  However, because the House 
Armed Services Committee (HASC) decided to exclude any base 
closure legislation in their Defense Authorization bill, 
the Senate carried the hotly contested proposal to 
conference committee (Loeb, 2001; H.R. 2586, 2001; 
S.AMDT.1622, 2001; Johnson, 2000).  
 
D. HOUSE ACTION 
On 28 June 2001, the House Armed Services Committee, 
chaired by Republican Congressman Bob Stump, held its 
hearing on the Bush Administration’s FY2002 defense budget 
(Stump, 2001a).  Secretary Rumsfeld reported in his opening 
remarks that DoD currently possesses 23 percent excess base 
structure, and if Congress authorized an additional BRAC 
round, DoD “could potentially save an estimated $3 billion 
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23 Senator Snowe argued, “review of the last [BRAC] process reveals 
that these [EFI] criteria are nearly identical to those used in the 
1995 [politicized] round” (Snowe, 2001a).  
per year” (Rumsfeld, 2001a).  Mr. Rumsfeld asked if 
“Congress could help” (Rumsfeld, 2001a).   
Replies from the Republican-controlled House of 
Representatives revealed “serious concern about going 
through the same [base closure] routine” (Hefley, 2001; 
Snyder, 2001a, 2001b; Hunter, 2001; Spence, 2001; Towell, 
2001a; H.R.4897, 2002; H.R.1198, 2003; H.R.1638, 2003).  
BRAC opponents raised the problem of privatization-in-
place, and strongly believed “any future commission cannot 
have the power to reverse” the base closure decisions of 
the Secretary of Defense (McHugh, 2000; Hostettler, 2001; 
Costa, 2002; Towell, 2001a).  Although acknowledging that 
Congress has “a different situation,” now that President 
Clinton is no longer in office, the HASC still informed 
Secretary Rumsfeld that “there's some more convincing to be 
done” (Hefley, 2001; Spence, 2001).   
Most declared that Congress shouldn’t consider a BRAC 
round until DOD adequately evaluates and defines its 
military strategy for the war on terrorism (H. Wilson, 
2001; Shows, 2001; Bentsen, 2001; Brown, 2001; Pomeroy, 
2001; Forbes, 2001; Ortiz, 2001).  Members also voiced 
unease that once a base is closed it can’t be reconstituted 
“should there be another national crisis” (Spence, 2001; G. 
Taylor, 2001; Hunter, 2001).  DoD’s current environmental 
processing of over 100 closures and realignments from 
previous BRAC rounds was also cited as reason for delaying 
base closures (Pomeroy, 2001; Pruett, 2001; Budget 
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Estimates, 2002).24  Members simply declared, “now is not 
the time” (H. Wilson, 2001; Bentsen, 2001; Brown, 2001).   
BRAC opponents admitted DoD may “have excess inventory 
in certain areas” but doubted “if there was, in fact, 
savings” from base closures (Abercrombie, 2001; Taylor, 
2001; Brown, 2001; Forbes, 2001; Hostettler, 2001; 
Underwood, 2001).  In fact, members declared, BRAC savings 
“are illusory” and “there is no evidence that money has 
been saved during the last round of base closure” (H. 
Wilson, 2001; Baldacci, 2001; Pomeroy, 2001).  Concerns 
about the Moral Welfare and Recreation (MWR) capital assets 
lost in the base closure process were also addressed 
(Bartlett, 2001; Ortiz, 2000). 
Several members suggested that DoD create a BRAC 
exclusion list early in the base closure process so that 
communities could be taken off the BRAC “anxiety list” 
(Hefley, 2001; Snyder, 2001b; Costa, 2002; Towell, 2001a; 
McHugh, 2000).  In fact, Mr. Snyder proposed legislation 
that directed DoD to develop a [core] list of at least 50 
percent of DoD’s “military installations to be excluded 
from the base closure and realignment process” (Snyder, 
2001b; H.R.1820, 2001).     
Although Mr. Snyder’s “Military Infrastructure 
Transformation Act of 2001” proposed authorizing a base 
closure round in 2003, the U.S. House didn’t “really have 
the stomach for a BRAC right now” (H.R.1820, 2001; Schrock, 
2001).25  The HASC decided to exclude base closure 
                     24 As of 30 September 2001, DoD has transferred 42 percent of its 
518,500 acres of unneeded base property; environmental cleanup remains 
the primary impediment (GAO, 2002). 
  63
25 H.R.1820, the Military Infrastructure Transformation Act of 2001, 
had one co-sponsor (H.R.1820, 2001). 
authorization from their FY2002 Defense Authorization bill, 
and the week before the Senate started its floor debate 
concerning BRAC authorization, Mr. Snyder withdrew his BRAC 
amendment from the HASC bill (Bunning, 2001b; Snyder, 
2001c; H.R. 2586, 2001; S.AMDT.1622, 2001).  Any 
improvements to the BRAC process by the U.S. House of 
Representatives would have to be ironed out in conference 
(Johnson, 2000).  
 
E. CONFERENCE AGREEMENT 
In Congress, the President, and Public Policy, Michael 
Mezey observes that “more often than not, the President and 
the Congress find themselves in a stalemate about what 
should be done” (Mezey, 1989, p. xiii).  Mezey claims that 
“one way to force action is to create a crisis” so that the 
President and Congress will “be encouraged to suspend their 
hostilities and come to an agreement” (Mezey, 1989, p. 
147).  Clearly, the events of September 11th provided the 
crisis to encourage the Congress and the new Bush 
Administration to agree to a base closure round in 2005. 
The base closure provision in the FY2002 Defense 
Authorization bill caused weeks of intense bitter struggle 
between the Senate and the House, delaying approval of the 
Defense Act until Dec. 13, 2001 (S.1438, 2001; Stump, 
2001c; Sia, 2003).26  Many doubted the base closing 
provision could survive the final version of the compromise 
bill debated behind closed doors (G. Wilson, 2001).  In 
fact, House members stated they “couldn't touch” the base 
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26 Congressional oversight concerning the deployment of a national 
missile defense also delayed the reporting of the compromise bill (G. 
Wilson, 2001). 
closure issue because the House considered base closures to 
be off the table in conference (Hebert, 2001).   
However, despite “the strong reservation of many House 
Members,” the HASC leadership yielded on the base closure 
provision after President Bush threatened to veto the 
Defense Authorization bill (Stump, 2001c; Pomeroy, 2001; 
Towell, 2003).  Senators Warner and Levin commended HASC 
Chairman Stump and ranking member Ike Skelton for their 
tremendous “courage” in accepting the base closure 
provision even though “scarcely a voice” supported base 
closures in the House (“Conferees,” 2001).  Congress 
accepted the conference agreement on the FY2002 Defense 
Authorization Act on 13 December 2001 (S.1438, 2001). 
The FY2002 Defense Authorization Act authorized DoD to 
conduct a single base realignment and closure round in 2005 
vice 2003 (S.1438, 2001; U.S. Code, 2002).  Although 
Senator Warner declared he would have preferred a base 
closure round in 2003, the two-year delay allowed the U.S. 
economy time to recover, gave DoD time to define its 
military strategy and minimized the effect on long-term 
defense budgets (Hebert, 2001; Stump, 2001b).  
Additionally, the conferees revised the base closure 
procedures “to create a fair and objective process that 
places national security as the principal objective, [and] 
closes loopholes” in the base closure process (Stump, 
2001b).    
The conference legislation incorporated the five key 
elements of the previous BRAC process as the framework for 
closing and realigning bases in 2005 (S.1438, 2001; GAO, 
1998b).  In the newly outlined process, the Pentagon is to 
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conduct a “comprehensive inventory of military 
installations world-wide for each military department,” and 
prepare a 20-year force-structure plan based on probable 
threats to national security beginning in fiscal year 2005 
(S.1438, 2001).27  After determining closures are “necessary 
and justified” the Pentagon must also certify that 
“recommendations for base closures will result in annual 
net savings by 2011” (Stump, 2001b).28 
Next, using “military value” as the primary selection 
criteria DoD will present a list of recommendations to an 
independent Commission by May 16, 2005 (S.1438, 2001; U.S. 
Code, 2002).29  DoD must also consider among its selection 
criteria: (1) “the extent and timing of potential costs and 
savings;” (2) “the economic impact on existing 
communities;” (3) “local government views;” (4) “the impact 
of costs related to potential environmental restoration;” 
and (5) efficiencies gained from joint basing (S.1438, 
2001; U.S. Code, 2002).30   
The 2001 legislation authorized privatization-in-
place, but only if it was determined to be cost-effective 
and specifically authorized by the Commission (S.1438, 
2001).  Additionally, it authorized DoD to recommend that 
an installation be placed in an inactive caretaker status 
                     27 On 15 November 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld established the 
Infrastructure Executive Council (IEC) as the oversight body for the 
entire BRAC 2005 process (Rumsfeld, 2002).   
28 The Defense Act does not specify the desired amount of annual 
savings  (S.1438, 2001). 
29 Previous 1990 BRAC law directed DoD to establish three categories 
of selection criteria, “Military Value,” “Return on Investment,” and 
“Community Impacts” (GAO, 1997, p. 54).   
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30 In his 15 November 2002 memorandum, Secretary Rumsfeld directed 
that examining and implementing “opportunities for greater joint 
activity” is a “primary objective in the BRAC 2005 process” (Rumsfeld, 
2002). 
if the base could be needed for future reconstitution 
(S.1438, 2001; Stump, 2001b).  The legislation also 
stipulated the reimbursement of Commissary surcharge and 
non-appropriated MWR funds lost during a base closure 
(S.1438, 2001).        
The 2001 legislation allows the President, with 
congressional consultation, to appoint a nine member 
Commission to convene in March 2005 (Stump, 2001b; S.1438, 
2001).  The Commission, upon receipt of DoD’s closure 
recommendations, reviews the list and with authority to 
change DoD’s recommendations, sends its own recommendations 
to the President by September 8, 2005 (S.1438, 2001; U.S. 
Code, 2002).  However, the Commission can add a base only 
if DoD “deviated substantially from the force-structure 
plan” and if the “consideration is supported by at least 
seven members of the Commission” (S.1438, 2001; U.S. Code, 
2002).31  The Commission can delete a base from the list by 
a simple majority vote (Stump, 2001b).  The Commission must 
also inform the Secretary of Defense of any proposed 
changes to DoD’s recommendations (S.1438, 2001).  
The President has two weeks to accept the Commission’s 
recommendations in their entirety (“all or none”) and 
forward the list to Congress (S.1438, 2001; U.S. code, 
2002).  If the President chooses to reject the list, he can 
require the Commission to present a revised list by October 
20, 2005 (S.1438, 2001; U.S. Code, 2002).  The President 
has the option of terminating the base closing process by 
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31 In 2002, Congress required the Commission to conduct a site visit 
by at least two commissioners before it could add a base; the House 
attempted to require the unanimous consent of all nine members as well; 
however, the Senate only agreed to the site visit provision (H.R.4546, 
2002).  
rejecting the list a second time (S.1438, 2001; U.S. Code, 
2002).  If the President accepts the initial 
recommendations, he then forwards the list to Congress by 
September 23, 2005 (S.1438, 2001).32  Congress will then 
have 45 days to either accept the list all or nothing, or 
pass a Joint Resolution rejecting the Commission’s 
recommendations in their entirety (S.1438, 2001; U.S. Code, 
2002). 
On 28 December 2001, President Bush, after citing his 
regret that EFI was delayed until 2005, signed the FY2002 
Defense Authorization Act (Bush, 2001; S.1438, 2001; U.S. 
Code, 2002).33  When House Majority Leader Dick Armey was 
asked if the 1990 BRAC law he helped create needed 
changing, he responded, “the [1990 BRAC] legislation was 
designed to protect the process from political decision-
making” (McCutcheon, 2002).34  He added, “I’m not going to 
dismiss any changes out of hand, but I’d be very wary” 
(McCutcheon, 2002).35   
 
 
                     32 If the President accepts the Commission’s revised set of 
recommendations, he forwards the list to Congress by November 7, 2005 
(S.1438, 2001). 
33 On 9 May 2003, the HASC Subcommittee on Readiness agreed to repeal 
DoD’s authorization to conduct a base closure round in 2005; the BRAC 
repeal did not survive the full HASC markup of the Defense 
Authorization bill (Peterson, 2003). 
34 On 14 May 2003, the HASC approved language requiring DoD “to name 
at least half of the nation’s installations as essential to national 
defense,” and to prohibit the BRAC Commission from considering this 
list of essential installations for closure or realignment (Hunter, 
2003). 
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35 On 22 May 2003, the U.S. House approved the FY2004 Defense 
Authorization bill directing DoD to create a core list of installations 
that will not be considered for closure (H.R.1588, 2003).  The bill 
also requires the unanimous consent of the Commission before adding a 
base to the BRAC list (H.R.1588, 2003). 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
In 1988 Congress created the Base Realignment and 
Closure (BRAC) process to reduce the parochial politics of 
base closings (Sorenson, 1998).  Suspicious of the 1988 
special commission chartered by the Defense Secretary, 
Congress created an independent base closing commission in 
1990 to conduct three authorized BRAC rounds in 1991, 1993, 
and 1995 (GAO, 2002).  By 1996, with the expiration of the 
1990 BRAC legislation, the Department of Defense’s (DOD) 
authority to close or realign bases reverted to the highly 
restrictive 1977 BRAC law (GAO, 1997; Hadwiger, 1993). 
In 1997, the Secretary of Defense asked Congress to 
authorize two more BRAC rounds (Lockwood, 2002).  However, 
congressional resentment over President Clinton’s 
involvement with the 1995 BRAC round persisted until the 
end of his second term and this intervention was repeatedly 
cited as the primary reason for congressional opposition to 
another BRAC round (Lockwood, 2002).   
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On December 13, 2001, the 107th Congress finally 
approved an additional BRAC round, to be conducted in 2005.  
This policy decision was preceded by years of political 
dispute and dialogue between Congress and the executive 
branch.  Much of this debate centered on the Clinton 
Administration’s privatization-in-place of two bases 
scheduled for closure by the 1995 BRAC Commission and the 
dispute over estimated BRAC costs and savings.  After 
painstaking compromise and a national security crisis, 
reformed BRAC legislation was passed, balancing political 
leadership and national strategy with job loss and 
disruption to local communities.  In short, the maxim that 
“all politics is local” is as applicable to military base 
closures as it is to elected officials who must continually 




1.  Primary Research Question 
This research identifies seven significant explanatory 
variables involved in the decision of the 107th Congress to 
amend the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 
and authorize a single BRAC round in 2005.  Congress 
authorized a BRAC round after: (1) DoD provided convincing 
evidence it possessed excess infrastructure and that BRAC 
produced savings despite significant closing and 
environmental remediation costs; (2) a new administration 
confirmed the need for base closings; (3) Congress 
determined that the national economy couldn’t accept both 
increased spending on deteriorating infrastructure and the 
war on terrorism; (4) BRAC studies confirmed that most 
communities rebound economically after a base closure; (5) 
senior legislative leadership agreed that the timing for 
another BRAC round was possible; (6) Congress improved the 
BRAC law to reduce the parochial politics of base closings; 
and (7) Congress delayed BRAC as part of a political 
compromise to allow elected officials to vote for a policy 
that can cause them to lose their jobs.36  
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36 Representatives who served fewer than two terms were voted out of 
office in the 1996 House election if a base closing occurred in their 
district; there were several freshmen on the HASC in 2001 (Rocca, 
2001).  
Another method of describing why Congress authorized a 
BRAC 2005 is to view the explanatory variables as parts of 
a balanced equation:  
BRAC 2005 = Convincing + Cost + Crisis + Compromise 
Very simply, Congress authorized a BRAC round when: 
(1) DoD provided convincing evidence that it possessed 
excess infrastructure; (2) cost to maintain DoD’s excess 
infrastructure while also waging the war on terrorism 
exceeded available budgetary resources; (3) the crisis of 
September 11th provided the heightened awareness needed to 
force action and break the stalemate between the Executive 
and Congress; and (4) compromise in government decision-
making was achieved between agencies with varying influence 
(Allison, 1999).  
The DoD provided convincing evidence that it possessed 
excess infrastructure as early as 1995 and certainly by 
2001.  The congressionally mandated Quadrennial Defense 
Reviews (QDR) of 1997 and 2001 proved that DoD possessed 
too many bases, by at least 20 percent (BRAC Report, 1995; 
QDR, 1997, 2001).  The Congressional Research Service 
(CRS), Congressional Budget Office, (CBO) and the General 
Accounting Office (GAO) all confirmed DoD’s findings 
concerning excess infrastructure (Lockwood 2002; Siehl, 
1997b; CBO, 1998; GAO, 1998c, 2002).  Congress eventually 
accepted the veracity of DoD’s claims. 
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Additionally, Congress acknowledged that the defense 
budget couldn’t support the cost of funding deteriorating 
infrastructure while also fighting the war on terrorism.  
When the crisis of September 11th indicated a heightened 
awareness for increased defense spending, and when DoD, 
CRS, CBO, and GAO convincingly argued that BRAC produced 
substantial savings, Congress accepted BRAC as a 
responsible way of providing offset funding (BRAC Report, 
1998; Lockwood, 2001; CBO, 1998; GAO, 1998b, 1998c, 2002). 
Finally, compromise in government decision-making was 
achieved between government agencies with varying influence 
(Allison, 1999).  The President, DoD, the Senate Armed 
Services Committee (SASC), the House Armed Services 
Committee (HASC), and Congress as a whole, compromised to 
achieve a policy decision that reduced infrastructure, 
increased defense spending and improved the BRAC process 
(S.1438, 2001). 
 
2. Subsidiary Research Questions 
a. What is the Organizational Framework of the 
Base Closing Process? 
Six key elements encompass the base closing 
process: (1) a comprehensive inventory of military 
installations world-wide to determine if closures are 
necessary based on probable threats to national security; 
(2) an independent commission; (3) clearly articulated, 
published criteria; (4) certified and accurate data; (5) 
mandated time lines; and (6) presidential and congressional 
acceptance or rejection of the BRAC list in its entirety 
(GAO, 1998b; S.1438, 2001). 
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b. What are the Important Differences in the 
Base Closing Laws of 1977, 1988, 1990, and 
2001? 
1. The 1977 law:  
Mandating extensive legal regulations, the 1977 
law prevented DoD from closing any major military 
installation from 1977 to 1990 (Siehl, 1997b; CBO, 1996). 
2. The 1988 BRAC law:  
Although it allowed DoD to close excess bases by 
creating an independent, twelve-member Commission appointed 
by the Secretary of Defense, the 1988 BRAC law failed to 
alleviate the potential for parochial politics. 
3. The 1990 BRAC law: 
Mandating the establishment of three (non-
election year) presidentially-appointed Commissions, the 
1990 BRAC law proved highly successful until compromised by 
the policy decision to conduct privatization-in-place 
during the 1995 BRAC round. 
4. The 2001 BRAC law: 
The 2001 BRAC legislation: (1) clarified the 
privatization-in-place policy; (2) directed a worldwide 
comprehensive inventory of military installations; (3) 
required that base closures result in annual net savings by 
2011; (4) authorized bases to be placed in an inactive 
status; (5) rescheduled the BRAC process to begin later in 
the fiscal year; (6) established a one-time, nine-member 
BRAC Commission two election terms in advance; and (7) 
limited the Commission’s ability to add bases to the 
closure list (S.1438, 2001).   
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c. What were the Important Policy Issues 
Surrounding Base Closure from the 1960s 
until 2001? 
The important policy issues surrounding base 
closure from the 1960s until 2001 were: (1) the 
presidential use of base closure for political reprisal; 
(2) congressional prohibition of base closure despite 
annual DoD requests; (3) DoD’s overseas bases; (4) the 1995 
BRAC round controversy surrounding privatization-in-place; 
(5) questionable BRAC savings; (6) the significant closing 
and environmental remediation costs; (7) the authority of 
BRAC Commissions to alter DoD’s recommendations; (8) 
disruption and job loss to local communities; and (9) the 
argument that DoD should create a BRAC exclusion list.37  
 
d. How Did the FY2002 Defense Authorization Act 
Resolve the Issues Surrounding Base Closure 
from the 1960s until 2001? 
The FY2002 Defense Authorization Act resolved the 
issues surrounding base closure from the 1960s until 2001 
by: (1) the establishment of a one-time, nine-member BRAC 
Commission with rescheduled timelines; (2) directing a 20-
year force-structure plan based on probable threats to 
national security; (3) directing a comprehensive inventory 
of military installations world-wide; (4) authorizing 
privatization-in-place, but only if it was determined to be 
cost-effective and specifically authorized by the 
Commission; (5) requiring that base closures result in 
annual net savings by 2011; (6) authorizing bases to be 
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37 Although the U.S. House of the 108th Congress approved language 
requiring DoD “to name at least half of the nation’s installations as 
essential to national defense,” this issue remains unresolved (Hunter, 
2003; H.R.1588, 2003). 
placed in an inactive status; (7) limiting the Commission’s 
ability to add bases to the closure list; (8) directing DoD 
to consider local government views; and (9) postponing the 
political fallout from BRAC until 2005. 
 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
In conducting this legislative analysis, several areas 
for future research were discovered.  This section outlines 
two issues that may lead to further inquiry. 
On July 1995 President Clinton approved the 1995 BRAC 
list, but told Congress to allow “Privatization-in-Place” 
to be an integral part of the BRAC process for two Air 
Force depots located in voter-rich California and Texas 
during a presidential election year (Clinton, 1995; Siehl, 
1997b).  Congress believed the Administration violated the 
integrity of the BRAC process (H. Rpt. 104-220, 1995).  
However, in 2001, when the U.S. Senate amended the 1990 
BRAC law to authorize a base closure round (S.1438), it 
excluded legislation addressing the issue of privatization-
in-place, even though the earlier Levin-McCain bill (S.397) 
and the EFI legislative proposal outlined the 
privatization-in-place policy (S.1438, 2001; S.397, 2001; 
EFI, 2001b).  The policy argument involving executive 
involvement and the legislative strategy concerning 
privatization-in-place provide an opportunity for further 
study.   
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There is uncertainty associated with the projected 
personnel reductions attributed solely to BRAC during the 
Cold War drawdown (CBO, 1998; BRAC 1998, p. 49; Lockwood, 
2002, p. 3; Baucus, 2001; Stevens, 2001; Tapp, 2001).  
Analysis of DoD’s reports reveals, and CBO confirms, that 
80 percent of BRAC savings result from personnel reductions 
(CBO, 1998).  However, the U.S. Army doesn’t attribute any 
reductions in military personnel to the 1991 and 1993 base 
closures, and reports eliminating only five personnel due 
to the 1995 BRAC round (BRAC Report, 1998).  Additionally, 
the Pentagon’s loss of the base closure estimates 
originally presented to the BRAC Commissions significantly 
complicates BRAC costs and savings measurement (Lockwood, 
2001; CBO, 1998).  One area of potential research would be 
to analyze the exact expenditures, cost avoidances, and 
savings during BRAC implementation, especially since DoD 
now expects “the largest-ever BRAC round” in 2005 (CBO, 
2003, p. 9).38  
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38 DoD must also certify that the recommendations for the BRAC 2005 
base closures will result in annual net savings by 2011 (Stump, 2001b). 
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